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ARTICLES 
A MODERN UNION FOR THE 
MODERN ECONOMY 
Jeffrey M. Hirsch* & Joseph A. Seiner** 
 
Membership in traditional unions has steeply declined over the past two 
decades.  As the White House and Congress are now completely Republican 
controlled, there promises to be no reversal of this trend in the near future.  
In the face of this rejection of traditional bargaining efforts, several attempts 
have been made to create alternative “quasi-union” or “alt-labor” 
relationships between workers and employers.  These arrangements 
represent a creative approach by workers to have their voices heard in a 
collective manner, though still falling far short of the traditional protections 
afforded by employment and labor law statutes. 
This Article critiques one such high-profile, quasi-union effort in the 
technology sector—the Uber Guild.  While the Guild does not provide any of 
the traditional bargaining protections found in the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA), it offers Uber drivers some input over the terms and conditions 
under which they work.  Falling somewhere between employment-at-will and 
unionization protected under the NLRA, the Uber Guild is a creative attempt 
to help both workers and the company to better understand how they can 
improve the working relationship. 
This Article navigates the Uber Guild and other nontraditional efforts that 
promise a collective voice for workers in the face of a precipitous decline in 
union membership.  This Article further explores how workers in the 
technology sector face unique challenges under workplace laws.  We argue 
that these workers are particularly well situated to benefit from a 
nontraditional union model and explain what that model should look like.  
While a traditional union protected by the NLRA is the optimal bargaining 
arrangement, we must consider the enormous challenges workers in the 
technology sector face in obtaining these protections.   
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input on this Article.  This Article benefited greatly from the extraordinary research efforts of 
Arden Lowndes, Megan Clemency, Chelsea Evans, Elliot Condon, and Emily Rummel.  This 
Article also benefited from the many helpful comments of those attending the Colloquium on 
Scholarship in Employment and Labor Law held at the Texas A&M University School of Law. 
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A nation that successfully moved from farm to factory to mainframe can 
certainly find a way to harness new digital technologies and data-driven 
decision making in a way that ensures workers are fairly treated and 
prosperity is broadly shared.  We can’t fall into the trap of believing that 
the latest innovation is so transformational that we simply can’t 
accommodate and acclimate.1 
—Former U.S. Secretary of Labor 
INTRODUCTION 
A federal court recently surmised that applying existing laws to on-demand 
workers is like being “handed a square peg and asked to choose between two 
round holes.”2  Workers in the on-demand technology sector represent a new 
breed of employees, and courts are still struggling to define this hybrid 
working relationship.  While the law grapples with the rights that should be 
afforded to these workers, many employee protections are simply falling 
through the cracks.  One clear example of this phenomenon can be seen with 
respect to union rights in this emerging sector.  Involvement in traditional 
union activity has seen a steep decline across all industries.  In the on-demand 
economy, it is almost nonexistent.3  This has forced workers to consider 
alternative ways to have their voices heard when pursuing workplace change. 
The decline of traditional unionism has been well documented and 
widespread.4  Union density rates have faced steep declines in the United 
States—and, to a lesser extent, in many other countries—over the last couple 
of decades.5  Yet, worker demand for representation and voice in the 
 
 1. Memorandum from Thomas E. Perez, former Secretary, Dep’t of Labor, to the 
American People (Jan. 5, 2017) [hereinafter Exit Memorandum], https://www.dol.gov/sites/ 
default/files/dol-exit-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/GRJ9-JP6Y]. 
 2. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (denying summary 
judgment). 
 3. For instance, in 2017, only 1.2 percent of workers in the computer-systems industry 
were union members. Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and 
Coverage Database, Union Membership, Coverage, Density, and Employment by Industry, 
UNION STATS, http://unionstats.gsu.edu/Ind_U_2017.htm [https://perma.cc/Y3QR-DLBJ] 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2018) [hereinafter Hirsch & MacPherson Coverage Database].  See 
generally Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage 
Database from the Current Population Survey:  Note, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 349 (2003); 
Steven Greenhouse, On Demand, and Demanding Their Rights, AM. PROSPECT (June 28, 
2016), http://prospect.org/article/demand-and-demanding-their-rights [https://perma.cc/ 
EUG6-5RYR] (“In many ways, digital on-demand workers face far more obstacles to 
organizing and being heard than workers in the traditional economy.  Isolated as so many of 
them are, on-demand workers rarely meet face to face, and online forums are a second-best 
substitute for building trust and solidarity.”); David McCabe, Labor, Tech Unite Behind Push 
for ‘On Demand’ Worker Rights, HILL (Nov. 15, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/ 
technology/260140-labor-tech-unite-behind-push-for-on-demand-worker-rights 
[https://perma.cc/ED4C-ZPAV].  
 4. See Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions:  A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive 
World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 584–85, 588–90, 598, 606–07, 613 (2007) (arguing that decline 
in unionization is largely the result of the NLRA’s failure to adopt a corporatist model). 
 5. Private-sector union density in the United States peaked at 35.7 percent in 1953 and 
is down to 6.5 percent as of 2017. See LEO TROY & NEIL SHEFLIN, U.S. UNION SOURCEBOOK:  
MEMBERSHIP, FINANCES, STRUCTURE, DIRECTORY, at A-1 (1985); Hirsch & Macpherson 
Coverage Database, supra note 3.  Although exact comparisons to other countries are difficult 
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workplace appears as strong as ever.  Nowhere is this demand more 
pronounced than in the emerging on-demand economy.6  This growing 
industry presents unique problems for workers as the employment status of 
these individuals is remarkably ill-defined.  This Article explores possible 
ways to bridge the gap between workers’ desires for representation in the 
technology sector and the severe limitations of the traditional collective-
bargaining arrangement envisioned by the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA).7 
Perhaps the best-case example of nontraditional unionization efforts 
involves Uber, a major technology sector company.8  Uber is a massive 
transportation business that provides an on-demand platform for drivers to 
use across the country.9  While the courts still struggle with the issue of 
whether these workers should be treated as employees or independent 
contractors,10 workplace protections remain in flux.  It is unclear which—if 
 
because of data differences, virtually all developed countries show significant declines in 
union membership over the past few decades. See Trade Union Density, OECD (2017), 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_DEN [http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20171107235235/https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_DEN] (showing total 
union density decline in the combined public and private sectors in France (from 19.6 percent 
in 1960 to 7.7 percent in 2013), Germany (from 34.7 percent in 1960 to 18.1 percent in 2013), 
United Kingdom (from 40.4 percent in 1960 to 25.1 percent in 2014), Canada (from 29.2 
percent in 1960 to 26.4 percent in 2014), and the United States (from 30.9 percent in 1960 to 
10.7 percent in 2014)). 
 6. See Patrick Dorrian, Gig Workers and Job-Related Bias:  Are Protections on the 
Way?, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 243, at 1 (Dec. 19, 2016) (discussing a survey showing that 
over a third of current U.S. workers are contingent and predicting that 43 percent of the U.S. 
workforce will be contingent by 2020, as well as a report showing that 69 percent of firms in 
the ride-sharing industry, which typically classify drivers as independent contractors, have no 
employees). 
 7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). 
 8. See The Unicorn List, FORTUNE (Jan. 19, 2016), http://fortune.com/unicorns/ 
[https://perma.cc/B4B4-QDVA] (listing Uber as top privately held company in the world, with 
value estimated at $62 billion). 
 9. See John Patrick Pullen, Everything You Need to Know About Uber, TIME (Nov. 4, 
2014), http://time.com/3556741/uber/ [https://perma.cc/W4WW-M2B6]; Driver App, UBER, 
https://www.uber.com/drive/partner-app/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20171107061220/ 
https://www.uber.com/drive/partner-app/] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018); Uber Cities, UBER, 
https://www.uber.com/cities/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20171107040028/https://www. 
uber.com/cities/] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018) (listing the hundreds of cities where Uber 
currently operates). 
 10. See, e.g., Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 778 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (finding 
that an employer-employee relationship may plausibly exist between Uber and its drivers); 
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1148–53 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (declining to 
rule on employment status as matter of law and noting the difficulty in applying a common 
law employment test to Uber drivers); Heather Kelly, Uber’s Never-Ending Stream of 
Lawsuits, CNN (Aug. 11, 2016, 10:30 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/11/ 
technology/uber-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/2NGT-CPNS] (stating that there are more than 
seventy federal suits pending against Uber); see also Mike Isaac & Noam Scheiber, Uber 
Settles Cases with Concessions, but Drivers Stay Freelancers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2016), 
https://nyti.ms/2mDBCaK [https://perma.cc/PV63-NERH]; Mike Isaac & Natasha Singer, 
California Says Uber Driver Is Employee, Not a Contractor, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), 
https://nyti.ms/2jLkD1K [https://perma.cc/ZN57-DFE6]; Erik Sherman, Uber Faces New 
Class Action Suit by Drivers, FORBES (May 4, 2016, 5:30 AM), 
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any—federal laws protect these workers, including the NLRA.  In the face of 
these challenges, Uber, and many of its drivers, has agreed to engage in a 
nontraditional collective relationship—the Uber Guild.11  This Article 
explores the import of this relationship, critiquing the model and explaining 
its implications for the broader gig-sector economy. 
Other alternative models also exist, and this Article examines these 
additional “alt-labor” relationships.  In particular, this Article explores the 
model adopted by the Freelancer’s Union—a collective group of workers 
who pursue benefits despite not having employment status under the law.  
Similarly, this Article examines “Working America,” a group that does not 
actively represent workers but instead promotes political action.  Finally, this 
Article explores attempts at quasi-union arrangements in the more traditional 
brick-and-mortar employment relationships and looks at efforts by General 
Electric and Volkswagen to create alt-labor agreements. 
It is important to note at the outset that although such alternative union 
options exist, they do not hold much hope for substantial increases in 
unionization nationwide.  The barriers to union representation are quite high 
and, especially given the important role of global trade, are largely outside 
the bounds of any realistic reform measures.12  This is especially true given 
that the White House and both houses of Congress are now controlled by 
Republicans, who have not traditionally pursued measures to bolster 
unionization.13  Accordingly, the options explored here are not panaceas for 
 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2016/05/04/will-a-new-class-action-suit-change-
uber-or-cause-drivers-to-permanently-lose/ [https://perma.cc/FPC9-U32E]. 
 11. See Josh Eidelson, Uber Found an Unlikely Friend in Organized Labor, BLOOMBERG 
(Oct. 27, 2016, 6:00 AM) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-27/uber-found-
an-unlikely-friend-in-organized-labor [https://perma.cc/7DW7-JG49]; Natalie Foster, Uber’s 
Major Step Forward for Workers, CNN (May 25, 2016, 6:14 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/25/opinions/uber-guild-agreement-portable-benefits-natalie-
foster/index.html [https://perma.cc/P842-B393]; INDEP. DRIVERS GUILD, 
https://drivingguild.org [https://perma.cc/S8TY-XNAT] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 12. See Douglas MacMillan, Uber Agrees to Work with a Guild for Its Drivers in New 
York City, WALL ST. J. (May 10, 2016, 4:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-agrees-
to-work-with-a-guild-for-its-drivers-in-new-york-city-1462913669 [https://perma.cc/TKR9-
Q3DP]; Noam Scheiber & Mike Isaac, Uber Recognizes New York Drivers’ Group, Short of 
a Union, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/technology/uber-
agrees-to-union-deal-in-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/2S6F-M5RR]; see also About the 
IDG, INDEP. DRIVERS GUILD, https://drivingguild.org/about [https://perma.cc/6LQN-EN4A] 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 13. See, e.g., Timothy Aeppel & Daniel Wiessner, Unions Brace for Pro-Business Shift in 
Labor Policy Under Trump, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2016, 3:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-usa-election-unions-idUSKBN1343LU [https://perma.cc/X9EU-LXTF] (“Trump 
has expressed support for so-called right-to-work legislation, which allows workers to avoid 
paying union dues.  Republican leaders in Congress have consistently sought such a change at 
the national level.”); Geoffrey Kabaservice, When Republicans Take Power, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/opinion/sunday/when-republicans-take-
power.html [http://perma.cc/U58T-APGY]; Jeffrey M. Jones, Approval of Labor Unions 
Holds Near Its Low, at 52%, GALLUP (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 
149279/Approval-Labor-Unions-Holds-Near-Low.aspx [https://perma.cc/B996-NE3D] 
(showing that 26 percent of Republicans approve of labor unions); Jeffrey M. Jones, New High 
of 55% of Americans Foresee Labor Unions Weakening, GALLUP (Sept. 1, 2011), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/149300/New-High-Americans-Foresee-Labor-Unions-
1732 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
the labor movement.  Instead, they are alternatives to the traditional 
collective-bargaining process that seem likely to do a better job at fulfilling 
some of workers’ unmet desires. 
Given this gloomy status quo, why seek any improvements?  Although no 
magic bullet exists, expanding worker voice and opportunities to participate 
in workplace decision-making promises gains for workers, as well as society 
as a whole.  The NLRA and other labor laws were enacted, at least in part, to 
improve the U.S. economy and the living standards of workers.14  Those 
policy goals still resonate—particularly given recent economic trouble—yet, 
the traditional NLRA model leaves many of them unmet.15  Addressing these 
shortcomings, even only in part, could have a real, positive impact for many 
people.  Efforts to circumvent the outdated model set forth in the statute have 
resulted in various alternative bargaining relationships between employers 
and workers.  At times, these new models even include workers that would 
not be considered “employees” under traditional employment laws.16 
The starting point for possible reform is the traditional labor union.  
Although traditional, private-sector unionization has been particularly weak 
in the last couple of decades, the fact remains that unions are the largest, best 
organized, and most well-funded employee-side groups in the United States.  
Thus, the initial question is what unions can do to change the current 
dynamic.  This Article discusses nontraditional groups and their potential 
contribution to expanding employee participation and voice, but those groups 
are nowhere close to having the strength of unions. 
Ultimately, no model will be perfect, but nontraditional unionization 
efforts are imperative if workers in the technology sector want any semblance 
of a collective voice.  The Uber Guild simply represents one joint attempt by 
workers and management to create a model that comports with the modern 
economy.  Given the high profile nature of this business, however, this 
example provides an excellent platform for discussing how traditional union 
benefits can be molded to fit nontraditional companies.  The modern union 
suggested by this Article contemplates this example and offers a broader 
approach for the technology sector, which could be applied in many other 
sectors as well.  Navigating the existing attempts at quasi-union 
 
Weakening.aspx [http://perma.cc/P6KE-L768] (showing that 69 percent of Republicans 
wished to see less union influence). 
 14. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (stating that “inequality of bargaining power between 
employees . . . and employers . . . substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and 
tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions”); see also National Labor Relations Act, 
NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb-introduction [https://perma.cc/JF4F-Y7A2] (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2018) (“Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (‘NLRA’) in 1935 to 
protect the rights of employees and employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to 
curtail certain private-sector labor and management practices, which can harm the general 
welfare of workers, businesses and the U.S. economy.”). 
 15. See generally Paul M. Secunda, The Wagner Model of Labour Law Is Dead—Long 
Live Labour Law!, 38 QUEEN’S L.J. 545 (2013) (discussing the shortcomings of the Wagner 
labor model in the United States). 
 16. See infra Part II (addressing alternative union models). 
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arrangements, this Article suggests the development of a modern union for 
the modern economy.17 
In Part II, this Article identifies the need for more cooperation between 
workers and management in light of the steep national decline in 
unionization.  Part III then examines how the lack of formal collective 
bargaining has directly impacted workers in the technology sector.  It further 
explores the nontraditional efforts at worker organization, including the 
Freelancer’s Union, Working America, and the Uber Guild.  In Part IV, we 
look at workplace participation groups and discuss their role in the 
employment setting.  Part IV also explains the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of quasi-unions in the technology sector, exploring how the 
alt-labor strategy can fit within the contours of the modern economy.  We 
then conclude in Part V by examining what quasi-unions should look like in 
the modern economy and describing the three primary forms such groups 
could assume. 
I.  THE NEED FOR MORE COOPERATION 
The history of labor regulation in the United States—particularly the 
NLRA, which governs most private-sector workplaces—embodies 
cooperation as an overarching policy goal.18  Throughout the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, the largely unregulated labor relations were 
marked by a rash of strikes, widespread boycotts, and violence by unions and 
employers alike.19  Congress responded to the economic turmoil that resulted 
from this labor unrest by enacting statutes limiting courts’ ability to enjoin 
labor activity;20 regulating labor relations in the railroad industry;21 and most 
importantly, in 1935, enacting the Wagner Act (or NLRA).22  Although 
Congress recognized that labor strife cannot be eliminated, the NLRA’s aim 
was to regulate the conduct of unions and employers so that harm to the 
national economy would be mitigated.23 
 
 17. Cf. Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 93 (2016) (arguing for a 
different approach to the field of labor law); Heather M. Whitney, Rethinking the Ban on 
Employer-Labor Organization Cooperation, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1456 (2016) 
(explaining that “various collaborations . . . have developed between new forms of worker 
organizations and employers” and that “these organizations are vulnerable to ‘labor 
organization’ classification and the bans on company support found in section 8(a)(2) of the 
National Labor Relations Act and section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act”). 
 18. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (declaring that the policy is to eliminate strife between 
employers and employees through cooperation); Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of 
the Wagner Act:  Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1461 
(1993). 
 19. For more detail, see PAUL M. SECUNDA ET AL., MASTERING LABOR LAW 8–12 (2014); 
Michael L. Wachter, The Striking Success of the National Labor Relations Act, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 427, 429–37 (Cynthia L. 
Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds., 2012). 
 20. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115 (2012). 
 21. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (2012). 
 22. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). 
 23. Id. § 151 (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the 
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and 
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As Congress made explicit in section I—the introductory portion of the 
NLRA, which sets forth its policies—the primary aim of the law was to create 
a new way of settling workplace disputes that would help the national 
economy.24  Among the threats to the economy at that time were employer 
denials of employees’ right to engage in collective action; unequal bargaining 
power; and unions’ use of strikes and other labor unrest that, among other 
things, impeded commerce, contributed to business depressions, and 
depressed wages.25  The solution, as discussed in the Introduction,26 is a 
system that encourages the “friendly adjustment” of labor disputes by 
protecting employees’ right to organize and to seek collective representation 
and by limiting strikes and other labor unrest.27  Although the NLRA 
expressly protected the right to strike, this option was to be more of a last 
resort, replaced by the less harmful process of collective bargaining.  
Although it is difficult to prove causation, by many measures this solution 
was successful for quite some time.28 
 
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and 
procedure of collective bargaining . . . .”). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Wachter, supra note 19, at 429–30 (indicating that strikes often required 
intervention by the National Guard and federal troops); see also Irving Bernstein, Americans 
in Depression and War, in A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER 151, 159–60  (Richard B. 
Morris ed., 1983) (noting that 1934 saw 1856 strikes, many of which were coupled with 
violence, including a coast-wide maritime shutdown in San Francisco and a textile strike in 
New England and the South that saw 376,000 workers walk off the job); Employer/Union 
Rights & Obligations, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/ 
employerunion-rights-and-obligations [https://perma.cc/PRL3-ALWF] (last visited Feb. 14, 
2018). 
 26. See supra Introduction. 
 27. In particular, the latter portion of 29 U.S.C. § 151 states: 
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize 
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or 
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized 
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the 
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, 
hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power 
between employers and employees. 
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some labor 
organizations, their officers, and members have the intent or the necessary effect of 
burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing the free flow of goods in such 
commerce through strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or through concerted 
activities which impair the interest of the public in the free flow of such commerce.  
The elimination of such practices is a necessary condition to the assurance of the 
rights herein guaranteed. 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes 
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and 
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice 
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of 
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of 
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their 
employment or other mutual aid or protection. 
 28. See Wachter, supra note 19, at 457–58 (arguing that the NLRA largely fulfilled its 
goals, particularly in stabilizing the nonunion sector). 
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Unions gained significant strength and power through their strong 
opposition to employers and their treatment of workers.29  Armed with the 
Wagner Act’s protections, union membership and influence increased 
exponentially.30  The large number of union members gave organized labor 
tremendous resources in terms of both finances and individuals committed to 
fighting for their and other employees’ working conditions.  Ironically, this 
early increase in strength for unions initially resulted in more work stoppages, 
not fewer.31  That said, these work stoppages were far less violent and 
disruptive than before.32  Moreover, with enhanced union power came 
significant wage increases and declines in wage inequality.33  Ultimately, 
however, unions’ strength fell precipitously, accompanied by fewer strikes, 
declining employee wages, and falling wage equality.34 
The steep decline in those numbers is accompanied by a similar decrease 
in unions’ power.35  But there is another, less obvious cost to this decline.  As 
union membership dwindled, the public became less aware of the unions’ 
role.  Many, if not most, individuals are not immediately related to anyone in 
a union36 so they lack an appreciation for the benefits that unions can provide.  
Combine this lack of awareness with the strong public relations campaigns 
that employers use to attack unions, and it is no surprise that their popularity 
has weakened over the years.37  This weakness, in turn, has reduced 
 
 29. See id. at 441, 457–58 (exploring the power of workers to boycott employers until 
they are allowed to unionize and the use of “closed shop” rules). 
 30. Private sector union density (the percentage of employees who are union members) 
rose quickly from 15 percent in 1936, the year before the Supreme Court approved the 
constitutionality of the NLRA, to 35.7 percent in 1953. TROY & SHEFLIN, supra note 5, at A-1 
(estimating pre-1953 data). 
 31. Wachter, supra note 19, at 451 (“In the period between the passage of the Wagner Act 
and the adoption of the Taft-Hartley amendments, the annual number of strikes was 3,539.  
Rather than bringing industrial peace, the number of strikes and lockouts nearly doubled under 
the Wagner Act.”). 
 32. Id. at 450. 
 33. See Lawrence Mishel et al., Wage Stagnation in Nine Charts, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Jan. 
6, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/charting-wage-stagnation [https://perma.cc/JTD2-
TYVY] (showing the relationship between increased union membership and decreased wage 
inequality, and vice versa, since 1917). 
 34. Id.; see also Wachter, supra note 19, at 454 (arguing that a major reason for the decline 
in strikes and union strength was the Taft-Hartley amendments, which made the NLRA more 
neutral and helped the nonunion private-sector grow in relation to the union sector). 
 35. Lawrence Mishel, Unions, Inequality, and Faltering Middle-Class Wages, ECON. 
POL’Y INST. (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.epi.org/files/2012/ib342-unions-inequality-middle-
class-wages.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D7W-GGQZ]; see Josh Levs, Analysis:  Why America’s 
Unions Are Losing Power, CNN (Dec. 12, 2012, 4:06 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/11/ 
us/union-power-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/D3PZ-Z9KH]. 
 36. For instance, in a 2017 poll, 83 percent of respondents said that no one in their 
household was a union member. Labor Unions, GALLUP, http://news.gallup.com/poll/ 
12751/labor-unions.aspx [https://perma.cc/8V83-BJPJ] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 37. Gallup has surveyed whether respondents “approve” or “disapprove” of labor unions 
since 1936. Id.  Approval of unions had been in the 60 to 70 percent range since the early 
1970s in all but one year, after which it has moved from as high as 65 percent and as low as 
48 percent, with the most recent poll in August 2017 showing that 61 percent of respondents 
approved of labor unions and 33 percent disapproved. Id.; see also Drew DeSilver, American 
Unions Membership Declines as Public Support Fluctuates, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 20, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/20/for-american-unions-membership-trails-
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employees’ ability to participate in the workplace and seek improvements in 
their working conditions.38 
Although many of the causes of this declining power are structurally 
economic and largely outside of unions’ control, it also seems apparent that 
a contributing factor is a serious public relations problem for unions.  Unions 
have been under political assault in recent years.  For instance, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has taken a renewed interest in challenging unions’ ability to 
collect dues.39  Moreover, unions have been the subject of substantial 
legislative and political attacks in Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin40—three 
states long known for union strength—which illustrates the degree to which 
unions have lost political and popular support.  The story is more complex, 
of course.  Unions still wield significant political power; they remain among 
the most important campaign contributors (and sources of campaign labor) 
for Democratic politicians.41  In addition, voters in Ohio overturned the 
legislature’s antiunion measures and Wisconsin witnessed an outpouring of 
 
far-behind-public-support/ [https://perma.cc/ZW83-S7HP] (citing a 2013 poll finding that 51 
percent of respondents had a favorable opinion of labor unions and that 42 percent had an 
unfavorable opinion). 
 38. See Paul Davidson, Decline of Unions Has Hurt All Workers:  Study, USA TODAY 
(Aug. 30, 2016, 5:02 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/08/30/decline-
unions-has-hurt-all-workers-study/89557266/ [https://perma.cc/49ZU-LAUM]; Mishel, 
supra note 35. 
 39. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017) (No. 16-1466) (granting certiorari 
in a case addressing whether mandatory public sector union dues violate objecting employees’ 
First Amendment rights); Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per 
curiam) (affirming the lower court decision on the same question as presented in Janus by an 
equally divided Court); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014) (prohibiting the 
collection of fees from those who do not wish to join a union). 
 40. See Monica Davey, Unions Suffer Latest Defeat in Midwest with Signing of Wisconsin 
Measure, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/us/gov-scott-
walker-of-wisconsin-signs-right-to-work-bill.html [https://perma.cc/M5BT-ARYW]; Monica 
Davey & Julie Bosman, In Victory for Unions, Law on Dues Is Struck Down in Wisconsin, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/09/us/wisconsin-law-union-
dues-scott-walker.html [https://perma.cc/7LGR-SCK2]; Matthew Dolan & Kris Maher, 
Unions Dealt Blow in UAW’s Home State, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2012, 5:16 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323339704578173100435478428 
[https://perma.cc/6QDF-MJN4]; Kathleen Gray, Anti-Union Bills Pass Michigan House of 
Representatives, DET. FREE PRESS (Dec. 7, 2016, 8:33 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/ 
news/politics/2016/12/07/anti-union-bills-pass-michigan-house-representatives/95122178/ 
[https://perma.cc/66MV-D2CB]; Steven Greenhouse, Wisconsin’s Legacy for Unions, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/business/wisconsins-legacy-
for-unions.html [https://perma.cc/N88Y-UDZ9]; Kris Maher & Amy Merrick, Ohio Vote Puts 
Curbs on Unions in Reach, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 3, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424052748704005404576176812441615134 [https://perma.cc/2JXP-
N7CM]; Sabrina Tavernise, Ohio Turns Back a Law Limiting Unions’ Rights, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/us/politics/ohio-turns-back-a-law-
limiting-unions-rights.html [https://perma.cc/3XKJ-7DTY]. 
 41. The political strength of unions, particularly public-sector unions, is also no doubt a 
major contributor to the political attacks against them. See, e.g., Tom McGinty & Brody 
Mullins, Political Spending by Unions Far Exceeds Direct Donations, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 
2012, 9:49 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304782404577488584 
031850026 [https://perma.cc/XLS5-8ZKW] (“Labor unions were responsible for $75 million 
in political donations, with 92% going to Democrats.”). 
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opposition against that state’s antiunion legislation.42  But the overall sharp 
decline in union density over the last few decades has largely been met with 
a collective yawn from the public.  Indeed, the fact that these antiunion 
legislative measures occurred in the first place speaks volumes about unions’ 
overall lack of support from the public. 
Given the low-density rate and poor public perception, unions should 
consider ways to bolster their popular support.  As the recent state-level 
attacks on unions and the debate over the Employee Free Choice Act43 show, 
support among the public—even individuals who are not union members or 
likely targets of future union campaigns—can have a significant impact on 
organized labor.  Traditional NLRA organizing strategies are simply not 
enough in this economy to maintain broad support for unions.  The difficulty 
is how unions might turn that trend around. 
The modern economy’s technology sector presents several additional 
hurdles.  Most notably, employers in this industry have fought fiercely in 
court to define these workers as independent contractors rather than 
employees.44  In the absence of true employment status, which is required for 
NLRA coverage,45 there are few opportunities for such workers to gain the 
protection of labor unions. 
Although there is no magic bullet for turning around unions’ fortunes and 
increasing employee voice,46 there does appear to be more that unions can do 
to achieve greater support than their current conflict-oriented model.  One 
option is a broad public relations campaign.  Through advertising and other 
types of outreach, unions could attempt to bolster their image among the 
general public in the hopes that it will stave off some of the attacks that seem 
to be cropping up more frequently.  But the focus of this Article is on other 
measures, particularly those that implicate ways in which unions, and other 
advocates for workers, can help to expand employees’ participation at work. 
The common theme to these alternatives is the need for these groups to 
adopt a more cooperative strategy.47  That is not to say that conflict with 
employers is unwise—indeed, unions should still fight hard for employees 
when warranted.  But a permanently adversarial posture does not seem to be 
 
 42. See Davey & Bosman, supra note 40; Steven Greenhouse, Bill Easing Unionizing Is 
Under Heavy Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/ 
09/us/09labor.html [https://perma.cc/MZ2T-J2EN]; Abby Sewell, Protesters out in Force 
Nationwide to Oppose Wisconsin’s Anti-Union Bill, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/26/nation/la-na-wisconsin-protests-20110227 
[https://perma.cc/CK2U-6KY8]; Tavernise, supra note 40. 
 43. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 44. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(addressing the employee/independent contractor question in the on-demand transportation 
context); see also infra Part II.B. 
 45. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012). 
 46. See Secunda, supra note 15, at 557–80 (discussing obstacles to private sector, union-
related voice such as captive audience meetings, weak NLRB remedies, difficulty in unions’ 
achieving first contracts, and permanent replacements for strikers). 
 47. See generally Samuel Estreicher, Strategy for Labor Revisited, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
413 (2012) (discussing potential arguments for and against more cooperative strategies). 
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serving unions well.48  A willingness to engage in cooperative relationships 
with employers and, at times, to forgo some goals normally associated with 
unionization may result in greater gains.  If employers view unionization as 
being less costly than they do now, in many instances they may be more 
accepting, or at least less resistant, to unions.49  Employer resistance will 
always remain a serious issue.  For many employers there is nothing a union 
can do to mitigate that hostility.50  Yet, other employers may view the costs 
of fighting unionization—costs that include financial expenditures and 
decreased employee morale—as being less worthwhile if the prospect of a 
union presence is less restrictive than it appears to be now.  Few employers 
are likely to welcome unionization, but even a reduction in the level of 
hostility could have a significant impact on unions’ ability to represent or 
assist workers.  Cooperation also allows independent contractors—in 
addition to employees—to have a voice in the organization.  This distinction 
is critical for attempts at collective action in the modern economy, where the 
use of contingent workers is pervasive. 
There are many ways in which unions and employee-side groups could 
engage in more cooperation with employers, both large and small.  This 
Article discusses a few more prominent options, such as unions being more 
open to nontraditional employee-voice mechanisms and unions and 
employee groups focusing more on the provision of services rather than 
classic collective representation.  This Article further identifies how these 
options would prove advantageous for workers in the technology sector, who 
currently face the most difficult hurdles with respect to traditional union 
representation. 
II.  THE MODERN ECONOMY, THE UBER GUILD,  
AND OTHER NONTRADITIONAL UNION AGREEMENTS 
Although traditional unions remain the most robust form of worker 
representation, it is not a realistic possibility for many, if not most, American 
workers—particularly those in the gig economy.  Taking into account the 
political barriers to substantial reform of U.S. labor law, we argue that, in 
many cases, seeking more cooperative strategies will be the best way to 
enhance worker voice and representation.  These strategies can, but generally 
need not, involve assistance from traditional unions.  However, such 
assistance would likely benefit both unions and workers.  Unions possess 
 
 48. If the level of adversity were magnified—for instance, to the pre-NLRA level, which 
involved significant labor unrest—unions’ influence may be greater. See Cynthia L. Estlund, 
Citizens of the Corporation?  Workplace Democracy in a Post-Union Era, in CORPORATIONS 
AND CITIZENSHIP 165, 165 (Greg Urban ed., 2014) (noting that support for the NLRA largely 
grew from a desire to mitigate labor unrest).  But there are no signs that unions and other 
proworkers groups are willing or able to create such disruptions. 
 49. See id. at 171. 
 50. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Why Workers Still Need a Collective Voice in the Era of 
Norms and Mandates, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 19, at 463, 465–66 (noting the widespread practice of 
employers trying to avoid unionization and arguing that this is caused by union effects on 
profits, as well as ideological, cultural, and psychological factors). 
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great expertise in representing workers, which would likely be of great value 
to workers involved with these alt-labor organizations.  In turn, interest in 
unions would likely increase, particularly from workers who have positive 
experiences, employers that see the potential for a more cooperative 
relationship with unions, and the public that has more exposure and 
experience with the gains to be had by increased worker voice. 
This Part first explores the unique problem facing workers in the modern 
economy in obtaining the employment status required to achieve protections 
under the NLRA and other workplace statutes.  Given these challenges, 
workers in the technology sector have much to gain from more nontraditional 
unionization efforts.  This Part then examines one such quasi-union effort by 
one of the largest gig-sector companies—the Uber Guild.  It further navigates 
attempts by workers to organize outside of the NLRA.  In particular, through 
the Freelancer’s Union, contingent workers have achieved some control over 
the working relationship.  And, Working America has provided workers a 
platform from which to pursue political actions.  Finally, this Part examines 
how more traditional brick-and-mortar-type companies have also pursued 
quasi-union arrangements and looks at how General Electric and 
Volkswagen have provided workers with a collective voice outside of the 
protections of the NLRA.  While much has been written on quasi-unions,51 
there is no literature extensively examining alt-unions in the context of the 
modern economy. 
A.  Contingent Workers 
One increasingly large group of employees in particular need of workplace 
protections consists of independent contractors and other contingent 
workers.52  Employers’ ability and willingness to classify workers as 
independent contractors has had an enormous impact on those workers.53  
 
 51. See, e.g., Michael C. Duff, Alt-Labor, Secondary Boycotts, and Toward a Labor 
Organization Bargain, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 837, 843–49 (2014) (addressing the legal 
problems that might arise from alt-labor coordination); Dayne Lee, Bundling “Alt-Labor”:  
How Policy Reform Can Facilitate Political Organization in Emerging Worker Movements, 
51 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 509, 529–35 (2016) (outlining tax and labor law reforms that could 
allow alt-labor organizations to emulate traditional labor unions); Michael M. Oswalt, 
Improvisational Unionism, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 597, 609–10 (2016) (examining the alt-labor 
movement’s influence on union practice); Brishen Rogers, Libertarian Corporatism Is Not an 
Oxymoron, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1623, 1631–35 (2016) (detailing the rise of the alt-labor movement 
and its current shortcomings). 
 52. See Adriene Hill, Freelancers Piece Together a Living in the Temp Economy, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/your-money/freelancers-piece-
together-a-living-in-the-temp-economy.html [https://perma.cc/C963-44XM] (noting a 
Government Accountability Office study showing 30 percent of the work force in 2006 as 
contingent, Bureau of Labor Statistics studies showing 14 million self-employed workers in 
February 2014, and that the number of temp agency workers has grown 46 percent since 2009). 
 53. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-859T, EMPLOYEE 
MISCLASSIFICATION:  IMPROVED OUTREACH COULD HELP ENSURE PROPER WORKER 
CLASSIFICATION 2 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07859t.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5AAZ-BX4L] (noting that statements of Sigurd R. Nilsen, Director of Education, Workforce, 
and Income Security indicate increased use of independent contractors); Ruth Burdick, 
Principles of Agency Permit the NLRB to Consider Additional Factors of Entrepreneurial 
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Aside from the often lower pay and lesser benefits that many employers 
unilaterally choose to provide, the independent-contractor classification also 
means that most labor and employment laws do not apply to these workers.54  
Thus, independent contractors neither have a right to collective action or 
bargaining nor any protection against, among other things, discrimination 
and pay that would violate the minimum wage or overtime rules.55  Recent 
efforts to assist independent contractors, such as the Uber Guild, show 
potential options for all workers to improve their working conditions, even 
in the current economic climate. 
Workers in the technology sector face an increasingly steep battle in their 
attempts to be recognized as “employees” under state and federal 
employment statutes.  These workers are difficult to define as the nature of 
their employment is nontraditional and not easily categorized.  The 
employment laws, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA),56 
were conceptualized at a time when the technologies that have enabled the 
success of Uber and others were nonexistent.  As adeptly stated by one 
federal court, “[t]he test . . . developed over the 20th Century for classifying 
workers isn’t very helpful in addressing this 21st Century problem.”57  The 
laws were thus not developed for these modern workers, and the courts have 
struggled in their efforts to define these individuals as either independent 
contractors or employees.  Take, for example, the pending litigation against 
Uber. 
 
Independence and the Relative Dependence of Employees When Determining Independent 
Contractor Status Under Section 2(3), 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 75, 79–125 (1997) 
(describing the development of employee/independent contractor distinction); Marc Linder, 
Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law:  An Ambiguous 
Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. POL’Y J. 187, 
223 (1999); Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees:  Employment 
Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 283 (2006). 
 54. See Danielle Tarantolo, Note, From Employment to Contract:  Section 1981 and 
Antidiscrimination Law for the Independent Contractor Workforce, 116 YALE L.J. 170, 179–
84 (2006); see, e.g., Jeanne Sahadi, When an Independent Contractor Is Really an Employee, 
CNN (July 16, 2015, 4:36 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/16/pf/independent-
contractors-employees/ [https://perma.cc/27YR-E3W9]; Independent Contractors, 
WORKPLACE FAIRNESS, http://www.workplacefairness.org/independent-contractors 
[https://perma.cc/MXT3-8RSS] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018); My Employer Says I Am an 
Independent Contractor.  What Does This Mean?, COMM. WORKERS AM. [hereinafter My 
Employer Says], http://www.cwa-union.org/about/rights-on-job/legal-toolkit/my-employer-
says-i-am-independent-contractor-what-does-mean [https://perma.cc/G8VQ-3HGY] (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2018).  See generally Stone, supra note 53 (examining the legal benefits and 
protections available to independent contractors compared to employees). 
 55. See Stone, supra note 53, at 279 (addressing the implications of independent 
contractor classification).  See generally Misclassification of Employees as Independent 
Contractors, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification/ 
[https://perma.cc/D35U-QMGH] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018); My Employer Says, supra note 
54. 
 56. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). 
 57. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
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B.  O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc. 
In O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,58 the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California considered a class action against Uber over 
whether Uber drivers should be considered employees or independent 
contractors.59  Four named plaintiffs brought the class action.60  Two of the 
named plaintiffs, Douglas O’Connor and Thomas Colopy, drove for Uber’s 
“UberBlack” service.61  UberBlack drivers use limousine-like vehicles to 
transport customers.62  O’Connor and Colopy had similar contracts with 
third-party limousine companies that provided them with vehicles to work as 
UberBlack drivers in exchange for fees.63  The other two named plaintiffs, 
Matthew Manahan and Elie Gurfinkel, drove for the company’s “uberX” 
service.64  UberX drivers transport passengers in their own personal 
vehicles.65  Under their contract with Uber, drivers were paid a “fee” for each 
ride; Uber set fares based on the duration and miles traveled during each 
trip.66  The plaintiffs presented evidence that Uber took about 20 percent of 
each completed ride as its “fee per ride.”67 
As part of its motion for summary judgment, Uber argued that drivers are 
independent contractors and not employees, and therefore, are not entitled to 
the protection of the California Labor Code.68  Uber maintained that it 
exercises minimal control over how its drivers actually provide services to 
Uber customers, which is an important factor in determining whether drivers 
are independent contractors.69  Uber stressed that its drivers set their own 
schedules, provide their own vehicles, and operate with little supervision.70  
The plaintiffs disagreed with Uber’s contentions,71 alleging that Uber 
“exercises considerable control and supervision over both the methods and 
means of its drivers’ provision of transportation services, and that under the 
applicable legal standard, they are employees.”72 
In analyzing the case, the court set forth California’s test for employment 
status.73  The court explained that the California Supreme Court’s seminal 
opinion in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations74 
“enumerated a number of indicia of an employment relationship” for 
 
 58. 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 59. Id. at 1135.  The underlying issues in the case, which was brought under the California 
Labor Code, involved allegations of unpaid expenses and tips for the Uber drivers. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1136. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1136–37. 
 68. Id. at 1137–38. 
 69. Id. at 1138. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. 769 P.2d 399 (1989). 
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determining whether an employer can rebut a prima facie showing of 
employment.75  The most important consideration is the putative employer’s 
“right to control work details.”76  The key question is “not how much control 
a hirer exercises, but how much control the hirer retains the right to 
exercise.”77  No one factor from Borello is dispositive, and multiple criteria 
must be weighed.78 
Applying the Borello analysis, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were 
presumptively employees because they provided a service to Uber.79  
Moreover, the court stated that whether a driver is an employee or an 
independent contractor is a mixed question of law and fact,80 generally to be 
decided by the jury.  The court noted that important evidence in the case 
included whether Uber could fire the drivers at will—a fact that was in 
dispute.81  Uber claimed that it could only terminate drivers “with notice or 
upon the other party’s material breach” of the contracts.82  In contrast, the 
plaintiffs argued that the contracts “seem to allow Uber to fire its drivers for 
any reason and at any time.”83 
Additionally, whether Uber had the right to significantly control the 
“manner and means” of the plaintiffs’ transportation service was also 
disputed.84  Uber pointed to various aspects of the driver contract in arguing 
that it did not significantly control the manner and means of the drivers’ 
transportation services.85  In contrast, plaintiffs noted that the Uber Driver 
Handbook clearly states that “[w]e expect on-duty drivers to accept all [ride] 
requests.”86  The parties strongly disagreed over various contentions relevant 
to whether Uber had the right to significantly control the “manner and means” 
of the transportation services.87  Based on these contested issues, the court 
could not conclude as a matter of law whether the drivers were employees or 
independent contractors under the Borello test.88  The court held that Uber 
was not entitled to summary judgment because genuine issues of material 
fact existed and a reasonable inference of an employment relationship could 
be found.89 
In sum, the court held that Uber drivers were presumptively employees 
because they provided a service to Uber.  However, a number of material 
 
 75. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1138 (quoting Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 901 
(9th Cir. 2010)). 
 76. Id. (quoting S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc., 769 P.2d at 403–04). 
 77. Id. at 1139 (quoting Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers Inc., 327 P.3d 165, 172 
(2014)). 
 78. Id. at 1140–41. 
 79. Id. at 1141. 
 80. Id. at 1146. 
 81. Id. at 1149. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. (quoting Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers Inc., 327 P.3d 165, 171 (2014)). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (quoting Ayala, 327 P.3d at 171). 
 88. Id. at 1153. 
 89. Id. 
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facts relevant to the “primary” Borello analysis were in dispute so summary 
judgment was precluded.90 
C.  The Traditional Standard 
As the Uber case makes clear, courts and litigants have faced immense 
struggles when applying the employee/independent contractor analysis to 
workers in the gig sector.  The Uber case in no way stands as an anomaly, 
and class action litigation on the employee/independent contractor issue has 
been widespread in the technology sector.  Cases have been brought against 
numerous on-demand companies,91 including GrubHub,92 Amazon,93 Handy 
(previously Handybook),94 CrowdFlower,95 Homejoy,96 Postmates,97 
Instacart,98 and Washio.99  An unsuccessful class action claim was even 
brought against Yelp, arguing that online reviewers of local businesses 
should be considered employees.100  Much of the difficulty for courts in these 
cases is in the application of a traditional legal standard to a developing, ill-
defined segment of workers in a modern sector of the economy.  Typically, 
the courts (at least with respect to the FLSA) have considered the following 
factors when making the determination as to whether a worker is an 
independent contractor or an employee: 
(1) the level of control the employer maintains over the worker; (2) the 
opportunity for profit or loss maintained by the worker in the business; (3) 
the amount of capital investment the worker puts into the process; (4) the 
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Cal. Apr. 14, 2014). 
 96. See Collective & Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand at 1, Iglesias v. Homejoy, 
Inc., No. 3:15-cv-01286-LB (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015); Class Action Complaint for Damages 
at 1, Ventura v. Homejoy, Inc., No. CGC-15-544750 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2015); Zenelaj 
v. Homejoy, Inc., No. CGC-15-544599 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2015); Class Action Complaint 
at 1, Malveaux-Smith v. Homejoy, Inc., No. 37-2015-00005070-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 13, 2015). 
 97. See First Amended Collective & Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand at 1, Singer 
v. Postmates, Inc., No. 4:15-cv-01284 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015); Complaint at 1, Marable v. 
Postmates, Inc., No. BC589052 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 23, 2015); Class Action Complaint at 1, 
Peppler v. Postmates, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-05145-RCL (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2015). 
 98. See Complaint at 1, Bynum v. Maplebear Inc., 160 F. Supp. 3d 527 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(No. 15-cv-6263); Complaint at 1, Moton v. Maplebear Inc., No. 1:15-cv-08879-CM, 2016 
WL 616343 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2016); Class Action Complaint for Damages & Demand for 
Jury Trial at 1, Cobarruviaz v. Maplebear, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 3d 930 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 
3:15-cv-00697-EMC); Class Action Complaint at 1, Sumerlin v. Maplebear, Inc., No. BC 
603030 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 2015). 
 99. See Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand at 1, Taranto v. Washio, Inc., No. CGC-
15-546584 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 29, 2015). 
 100. Jeung v. Yelp, Inc., No. 15-CV-02228-RS, 2015 WL 4776424, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 
13, 2015). 
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degree of skill necessary to perform the job; (5) whether performance of 
the job is integral to the operation of the business; and (6) the permanency 
of the relationship between the worker and the employer.101 
While different courts and jurisdictions have articulated the FLSA 
classification test in varying ways,102 all formulations focus on the 
“economic reality”103 of the situation and the level of control exercised by 
the employer.104  These factors were developed at a time when brick-and-
mortar facilities were predominant in the workplace.  The factors thus do not 
work well with companies like Uber or the broad range of other businesses 
in the technology sector.  While the reason for such worker misclassification 
can be debated,105 the difficulty likely arises from the increased amount of 
flexibility inherent in the technology workplace.  Because there is often not 
a physical or stationary place of employment, many gig-sector jobs involve 
varying terms and conditions of employment and substantial flexibility in the 
way workers conduct the job and when they do it.  As the traditional 
definition of an employee typically revolves around the issue of employer 
control, such worker flexibility is not often adequately considered as part of 
this test. 
The worker classification issue extends well beyond the FLSA to other 
employment statutes.  Indeed, for coverage, individuals must generally be 
considered employees for purposes of discrimination claims brought under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,106 the Americans with Disabilities 
 
 101. Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1511, 1526 (2016) (citing Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534–35 (7th 
Cir. 1987)). 
 102. See, e.g., McFeeley v. Jackson Street Entm’t., LLC, 825 F.3d 235, 241 (4th Cir. 2016); 
Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 104–05 (2d Cir. 2013); Moba v. Total Transp. Servs. 
Inc., 16 F. Supp. 3d 1257, 1263–64 (W.D. Wash. 2014); see also Means & Seiner, supra note 
101, at 1526 n.58.  The Supreme Court has also articulated a similar multifactor test, which is 
used for most federal statutes other than the FLSA and the Family Medical Leave Act. See 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992); 22 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 
§ 353 (1993); Robin Perry, Proving the Existence of an Employment Relationship, 108 AM. 
JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 247 (2009). 
 103. Cf. Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond “Economic Realities”:  The Case 
for Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 
38 B.C. L. REV. 239, 242 (1997) (arguing for an alternative test). 
 104. Means & Seiner, supra note 101, at 1526–27; see also Matthew T. Bodie, 
Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 661, 724 (2013) 
(discussing standards for worker classification); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Employee or 
Entrepreneur?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 362–64 (2011) (arguing for a change in the 
definition of employee).  
 105. See generally Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy & the Future of Employment and Labor 
Law, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 51 (2017) (discussing the worker classification issue in the on-demand 
economy). 
 106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer . . . to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants . . . which would 
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”). 
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Act,107 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.108  There is also 
pending litigation against Uber on the question whether the drivers are 
employees for purposes of the NLRA.109 
The debate over whether technology workers are employees or 
independent contractors will likely be waged for years with varying outcomes 
depending upon the particular employer or jurisdiction where the claim is 
brought.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court may have to weigh in on this 
issue.110  In the meantime, however, these gig-sector workers are left in an 
untenable position.111  With their employment status in flux, it will be 
difficult for them to obtain proper workplace protections and to have their 
collective interests adequately represented.  We argue here that these workers 
can substantially benefit from less traditional methods of organizing. 
Looking beyond the typical statutory protections, there are a number of 
avenues still available to such workers.  We address a number of these below, 
including the Freelancer’s Union and Working America.  We also outline 
nontraditional attempts of workers to have their collective voice heard with 
their employers through informal mechanisms.  In the technology sector, the 
best example of this is the Uber Guild, though we highlight other examples 
as well.  There can be no perfect approach to organizing outside of the 
statutory protections that Congress has provided to so many workers.  
Nonetheless, we argue that more workers should attempt to bargain for 
informal protections where these traditional protections are unavailable.  Our 
efforts here are by no means exhaustive.  Rather, we hope to spark a dialogue 
on this topic and welcome the input of scholars, the courts, litigants, and 
others as to how best to properly define these informal arrangements in a 
developing technological economy. 
 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (2012) (“As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term 
‘discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability’ includes . . . limiting, 
segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee . . . .”).  
 108. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse 
to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s age.”). 
 109. See Ted Hesson, NLRB Argues Against Uber, POLITICO (Nov. 3, 2016, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-shift/2016/11/nlrb-argues-against-uber-217214 
[https://perma.cc/8YZW-QMMN] (describing NLRB litigation involving allegations that 
Uber misclassified drivers as independent contractors); see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012) 
(defining “employee” and excluding independent contractors from the definition). 
 110. As the Secretary of Labor correctly observed recently, “The largest question for the 
next administration and beyond is how we embrace innovation in this dynamic economy while 
ensuring that the changing nature of work continues to honor the bedrock principle that 
workers are not in it alone in securing basic protections.” See Exit Memorandum, supra note 
1, at 14. 
 111. Cf. Exit Memorandum, supra note 1, at 14 (arguing for enforcement of labor standards 
“whether the workplace is virtual or brick-and-mortar—whether the work is associated with a 
mile-long manufacturing facility or a website”). 
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D.  Freelancers Union 
One of the higher profile approaches to servicing contingent workers has 
been the Freelancers Union.112  Founded in 1995, this organization has been 
described as the fastest-growing labor organization in the country, with over 
200,000 independent contractors, part-time workers, and temps as 
members—primarily in New York State but expanding to other areas of the 
country.113  The union does not engage in collective bargaining on behalf of 
its members; instead, it provides services to individuals who wish to purchase 
them, although membership is free.114  Central among those services is health 
insurance, which the union identified as its members’ primary concern.115 
To be sure, the Freelancers Union’s lack of traditional collective 
bargaining and representation limits its ability to change its members’ work 
conditions.  In spite of declining union density, unions have remained 
surprisingly capable of increasing their members’ wages,116 and their role in 
pursuing grievances on behalf of employees can be immensely important.  
But, the insurance and other benefits obtainable through the Freelancers 
Union can make a real difference for independent contractors and other 
workers who would otherwise not be able to afford them.117  Also, the union 
allows members to rate “clients” they have worked for, which provides 
potentially valuable information that these workers would otherwise lack.118  
Moreover, the union has made moves in the political arena that could benefit 
independent contractors nationwide, such as a push for the Department of 
Labor to track the number of such workers and a New York City Council bill 
to tighten enforcement of wage theft for freelancers in New York.119 
Neither of these goals has been met, although the union was able to 
convince New York City to implement a tax change that saved freelancers 
 
 112. See FREELANCERSUNION, http://www.freelancersunion.org [https://perma.cc/QS67-
LDGA] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 113. See Steven Greenhouse, Tackling Concerns of Independent Workers, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/business/freelancers-union-tackles-
concerns-of-independent-workers.html [https://perma.cc/FH3J-Z96L]. 
 114. These services offer much lower costs than individuals could obtain on their own. Id. 
 115. The union also provides other types of insurance, operates a health clinic, and has a 
401(k) plan. See Save for Retirement with Honest Dollar, FREELANCERSUNION, 
https://www.freelancersunion.org/benefits/retirement/ [https://perma.cc/9TUN-4EAZ] (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 116. See David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson, Changes over Time in Union Relative 
Wage Effects in the UK and the US Revisited, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF TRADE UNIONS 
197, 207–21 (John T. Addison & Claus Schnabel eds., 2003) (concluding that the U.S. union 
wage premium has declined only slightly over time). 
 117. The union also has an exchange for member-to-member service discounts. Freelancer 
Discounts, FREELANCERSUNION, https://www.freelancersunion.org/discounts/#/all 
[https://perma.cc/84TT-UXG5] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 118. See Gabrielle Wuolo, New Tool Lets Freelancers Rate Clients and Companies, 
FREELANCERSUNION (May 31, 2011), https://blog.freelancersunion.org/2011/05/31/new-tool-
lets-freelancers-rate-clients-and-companies/ [https://perma.cc/VFQ2-YCJN]; see, e.g., 
RATEMYBOSS.COM, http://www.ratemyboss.com [http://web.archive.org/web/201508181 
52950/http://www.ratemyboss.com:80/] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 119. Noam Scheiber, As Freelancers’ Ranks Grow, New York Moves to See They Get What 
They’re Due, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/ 
nyregion/freelancers-city-council-wage-theft.html [https://perma.cc/J4TM-FHZB]. 
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up to several thousand dollars a year.120  This political action, combined with 
its ability to attract workers with the option to purchase affordable benefits, 
gives the Freelancers Union and other organizations like it an opportunity to 
improve unions’ reputations among the public.  The union might also provide 
an important benefit for firms.  A significant cost of being an independent 
contractor or other nonstatutory employee is the lack of benefits often 
associated with that arrangement.  By permitting these workers to purchase 
benefits at a much lower price than what they could achieve on their own, the 
Freelancers Union—perhaps ironically—lowers the cost of working under 
these arrangements.  This, in turn, will make the independent contractors and 
other similar workers even more attractive to firms who are unable or 
unwilling to provide benefits for those workers.121 
E.  Working America 
Traditional unions have also explored the use of nontraditional employee 
groups.  For instance, the AFL-CIO’s organization Working America will 
celebrate its fifteenth anniversary in 2018.122  It describes itself as the fastest-
growing workers’ organization in the country123 and claims over three 
million members.124  Working America does not formally represent workers; 
instead, its primary goal is to promote relevant political action.125  For 
instance, it recently mobilized residents in the Albuquerque area to vote for 
a raise in the minimum wage.126  It has also distributed information on 
matters such as companies’ legal violations, mass layoffs, and offshoring 
 
 120. See Greenhouse, supra note 113. 
 121. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) also filled this role where its premiums were 
competitive with the Freelancers Union’s health insurance.  However, President Trump and 
Republicans in Congress have vowed to end the ACA, and it is unclear what, if any, 
replacement they would enact in its stead. See Mike DeBonis & Kelsey Snell, House GOP 
Discusses Obamacare Replacement Ideas—but Doesn’t Call Them a Plan, WASH. POST (Feb. 
16, 2017), https://wpo.st/kPjc2 [https://perma.cc/UYA2-NJF6]. 
 122. About, WORKING AM., http://www.workingamerica.org/about [https://perma.cc/ 
UPT3-ASXV] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 123. However, it is unclear on what basis Working America makes this claim, which the 
Freelancers Union also makes. See Greenhouse, supra note 113.  Suffice it to say that both 
groups have been in a period of significant growth. 
 124. See About, supra note 122. 
 125. See Alan Hyde, New Institutions for Worker Representation in the United States:  
Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 385, 389 (2006) (identifying Working America as 
an alternative worker organization aimed at “get[ting]-out-the-vote”); Harold Meyerson, 
Opinion, Labor Wrestles with Its Future, WASH. POST (May 8, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/harold-meyerson-labor-wrestles-with-its-
future/2013/05/08/852192d6-b74f-11e2-b94c-b684dda07add_story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
U6X2-LXGQ] (noting that Working America attempts to promote worker activism rather than 
secure collective bargaining contracts or membership dues); Richard B. Freeman, From the 
Webbs to the Web:  The Contribution of the Internet to Reviving Union Fortunes 8, 19–20 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11298, 2005), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11298 [https://perma.cc/3K7F-93CU]. 
 126. See Doug Foote, 40,000 Workers in Albuquerque Get a Raise This Week (You Built 
That), WORKING AM. MAIN STREET BLOG (Jan. 3, 2013, 10:40 AM), 
http://blog.workingamerica.org/2013/01/03/40000-workers-in-albuquerque-get-a-raise-this-
week-you-built-that/ [https://perma.cc/4VPT-WC23]. 
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practices, which may help improve employees’ ability to offset some 
employers’ opportunistic use of their information advantages.127  Like the 
Freelancers Union, Working America also has potential public relations 
benefits; as more workers and their families become acquainted with the 
potential benefits of labor organizations, all such groups may rise in the 
public’s estimation.  Indeed, the AFL-CIO has been open about Working 
America’s potential to foster support for more formal unionization efforts as 
employees gain more positive experiences with representational groups.128  
This could occur by organizing groups of employees who are already 
members of Working America or other employees learning about Working 
America and thinking more favorably about unionization as a result of that 
knowledge.  One example of the transition from nontraditional to traditional 
organizing is the Communication Workers of America’s WashTech 
organization.  WashTech started as a non-collective-bargaining group that 
assisted and lobbied for independent contractors and temporary workers at 
Microsoft but ultimately developed several groups that sought formal status 
as a collective-bargaining representative.129 
These nontraditional worker groups are merely a sample of the various 
types of organizations that may help workers outside of the classic Wagner 
model of collective bargaining.130  By removing the emotionally charged, 
formalistic labor law framework, they have an opportunity to assist workers 
while maintaining a less antagonistic relationship with employers—and a 
more favorable reputation with the general public.  However, these groups 
 
 127. For instance, Working America used to run a “JobTracker” website that allowed 
searches of over 400,000 companies and their labor practices. See Working America Exposes 
Outsourcing Culprits, N.C. ST. AFL-CIO (Oct. 13, 2010), http://aflcionc.org/working-
america-exposes-outsourcing-culprits/ [https://perma.cc/DUN6-2KLQ]; see also Jeffrey M. 
Hirsch & Barry T. Hirsch, The Rise and Fall of Private Sector Unionism:  What Next for the 
NLRA?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133, 1142–43 (2007) (discussing employers’ ability to take 
advantage of information asymmetries and unions’ ability to mitigate the problem); Amy 
Joyce, Labor Web Site Keeps Tabs on Business, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/17/AR2005111701623 
.html [https://perma.cc/3TCT-ECW4] (describing Working America’s online database of 
more than 60,000 companies).  In 2006, the AFL-CIO also entered into an agreement with the 
National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON) in part to create more community-based 
entities, called “worker centers,” that provide services and advocate on behalf of nonunion 
workers. See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Federation Forms a Pact with Day Workers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2006), https://nytimes.com/2006/08/10/us/10labor.html 
[https://perma.cc/7N2F-BWLW]. 
 128. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS:  EMPLOYMENT REGULATION 
FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 218 (2004) (noting that the AFL-CIO’s primary goal was to 
support possible future organizing efforts).  Unions have also initiated associate member 
programs that allow nonunion or unemployed workers to pay reduced dues and enjoy certain 
privileges of union membership. See Paula Brantner, Unions Create Associate Membership 
Programs to Help Maintain Their Strength, TODAY’S WORKPLACE (Sept. 17, 2004), 
www.todaysworkplace.org/2004/09/17/unions-create-associate-membership-programs-to-
help-maintain-their-strength [https://perma.cc/WL96-32AG]. 
 129. See STONE, supra note 128, at 235; Hyde, supra note 125, at 390–91. 
 130. See Whitney, supra note 17, at 1480–86 (describing other non-NLRA-covered 
groups); see also FRAN QUIGLY, IF WE CAN WIN HERE:  THE NEW FRONT LINES OF THE LABOR 
MOVEMENT 54 (2015) (stating that nontraditional worker groups are better at highlighting 
workplace problems than negotiating and maintaining agreements with employers). 
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have limits as well.  Although the lack of formal collective bargaining will 
generally improve relationships with employers, the reason is largely because 
full-fledged bargaining is more effective at extracting wages and other 
benefits.131  In addition, these groups could have funding difficulties without 
a steady source of dues or other income.132  Yet, despite these barriers, it 
seems that unions and other organizations concerned about workers would 
benefit from more experimentation with nontraditional assistance.  The 
degree to which these experiments will bear fruit is unclear, but it is highly 
unlikely that they will make things any worse.  One such high-profile 
experiment has recently been undertaken in the gig economy. 
F.  The Uber Guild 
In May 2016, Uber announced the creation of a drivers’ union that it coined 
the “Independent Drivers Guild,”133 which operates in New York City.  This 
drivers’ association falls far short of providing full union status but will offer 
workers “a forum for regular dialogue and afford them some limited benefits 
and protections.”134  This unique organization was created to represent 
drivers who (purportedly) wanted to remain independent while still being 
allowed to enjoy the protections and benefits of a collective association of 
Uber drivers.135  The guild provides the 35,000 Uber drivers in the city with 
a voice in company operations, as well as other new benefits and 
protections.136  The Independent Drivers Guild is affiliated with a regional 
branch of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers union (“IAM”).137 
The IAM represents nearly 600,000 members in aerospace, manufacturing, 
transportation, shipbuilding, woodworking, and electronics.138  The 
organization describes itself as the workers “moving North America.”139  The 
IAM is split into numerous districts; District 15, where the Uber Guild 
operates, is one of IAM’s largest, representing close to 19,000 active and 
retired members in various industries throughout the Northeast.140  Its 
 
 131. See Secunda, supra note 15, at 580 (noting that the benefits of these groups may not 
be meaningful enough to attract workers). 
 132. See Joni Hersch, A Workers’ Lobby to Provide Portable Benefits, in EMERGING LABOR 
MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 207, 207–11 (Richard B. Freeman et 
al. eds., 2005) (discussing possible funding problems with services that are partly public in 
nature, such as Working Today, the organization under which the Freelancers Union was 
formed). 
 133. Foster, supra note 11; INDEP. DRIVERS GUILD, supra note 11.  This Article refers to 
the Independent Drivers Guild as “the Uber Guild.” 
 134. Scheiber & Isaac, supra note 12. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Machinists Union, About, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/MachinistsUnion/ 
about [https://perma.cc/U4UE-3WH4] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).  The IAM also represents 
workers in the federal sector. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. About Us, MACHINISTS UNION DISTRICT 15, http://www.iamdistrict15.org/#!about-
us/c5ro [https://perma.cc/AV5R-943A] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
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mission is “to negotiate agreements on behalf of its members containing the 
best possible wages, benefits and protections while continuing to discover 
ways to better the lives of [its] members outside of their collective bargaining 
agreements.”141  Additionally, District 15 is “continuously endeavoring to 
increase union density by organizing the unorganized through traditional and 
alternative methods of unionization.”142 
The creation of the guild follows a series of lawsuits alleging that the 
drivers should be considered employees of Uber instead of being classified 
as independent contractors.143  The independent contractor classification 
used by Uber allows the company to keep labor costs low, and it also excludes 
the drivers from coverage under many labor and employment laws and 
regulations—including minimum wage and overtime provisions.144  
Independent contractors cannot form traditional unions.145  The guild 
agreement with the IAM attempts to soften concerns from both drivers’ 
groups and regulators regarding the company’s labor model and 
classification of workers without formally allowing the creation of a union.146  
Moreover, the possibility of unionization has led Uber to enter into 
agreements with drivers that help ameliorate some of the mounting tension 
over workplace issues.147  Uber had hoped to smooth relationships with the 
drivers after recent fare cuts and policy changes.  According to Uber’s chief 
advisor, the agreement was designed to “[i]mprove communication between 
Uber and our driver-partners; [p]rovide benefits without jeopardizing the 
independence and flexibility drivers love; and [g]ive drivers who have been 
barred from the app an additional voice in the deactivation appeals 
process.”148  This statement reveals the hope that the guild could provide a 
cooperative relationship that benefits both Uber and its drivers. 
The guild was established for a five-year period.  During those five years, 
“a group of drivers who are guild members will hold monthly meetings with 
Uber management in the city, where they can raise issues of concern.”149  In 
addition, “[t]he drivers will be able to appeal decisions by Uber to bar them 
from its platform, and can have guild officials represent them in their 
appeals.”150  The association also provides drivers with the option of 
purchasing discounted legal services, discounted life and disability 
insurance, and discounted roadside help for problems encountered while 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See supra note 10. 
 144. See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text. 
 145. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012) (excluding independent contractors from the definition 
of “employee”). 
 146. See About Us, supra note 140. 
 147. See Hesson, supra note 109.  
 148. David Plouffe, David Plouffe Remarks on Creation of Independent Drivers Guild, 
UBER (May 10, 2016), https://newsroom.uber.com/plouffe-idg-remarks/ [https://perma.cc/ 
8HZ4-VRNX]. 
 149. Scheiber & Isaac, supra note 12. 
 150. Id. 
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driving.151  During the five-year duration of the guild, the IAM has stated 
that it will halt its efforts to unionize the drivers and will not encourage them 
to strike.152 
However, the guild does not provide all of the benefits of a traditional 
union.  Although the drivers will have more of a unified voice, as noted, they 
will not achieve formal union or employee status.153  Guild members cannot 
bargain with Uber over contractual provisions concerning wage, benefits, or 
other protections.154  Instead, the company will exclusively determine these 
provisions.155  Nevertheless, Uber will receive more input from drivers when 
considering how to make these important determinations.156 
But, in joining the guild, drivers have not waived any labor rights.  If, 
during the term of the agreement, it is determined by a court that the drivers 
are employees, the IAM may still attempt to unionize the drivers.157  The 
guild will also work with Uber to lobby for policies on which they agree.158  
Uber has declined to specify how much the company will pay to support the 
new group,159 and the IAM plans to pay for some of the administrative costs 
of the organization.160  Drivers that join the guild will not be required to pay 
any membership dues.161 
In addition, Uber launched new features on its platform to further its 
attempts to ameliorate the frustrations voiced by many drivers.  For instance, 
under these changes in Uber’s mobile application, drivers are afforded the 
 
 151. Jing Cao & Eric Newcomer, Uber and Union Agree to Form Drivers Guild in New 
York City, BLOOMBERG (May 10, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-
10/uber-and-union-agree-to-form-drivers-guild-in-new-york-city [https://perma.cc/9RDS-
YX9Y].  According to the terms of the five-year agreement, Uber drivers will participate in 
regular meetings with Uber management, allowing drivers to discuss issues important to them. 
IAM District 15 Announces Groundbreaking Deal with Uber in NYC, INT’L ASS’N MACHINISTS 
& AEROSPACE WORKERS (May 12, 2016), http://www.goiam.org/news/iam-district-15-
announces-groundbreaking-deal-with-uber-in-nyc [https://perma.cc/G9VX-G95V].  If drivers 
in New York City are “deactivated” by Uber, they will be able to appeal the company’s 
decision. Id.  Uber recently published a driver deactivation policy, which explains why a driver 
might be prohibited from driving for Uber. Plouffe, supra note 148.  Additionally, in Seattle, 
Uber started a new appeals process where Uber partners hear the appeals of drivers who have 
been deactivated. Id.  The goals of these actions are to increase transparency and 
accountability. Id.  As part of the appeals process, drivers may now have guild officials 
represent them. Scheiber & Isaac, supra note 12.  Drivers will also have access to various 
discounts, including legal services, life and disability insurance, roadside assistance, and 
education. Id.; see also Cao & Newcomer, supra.  The guild’s leaders are still working out 
some details of the agreement. Foster, supra note 11; see Kia Kokalitcheva, Uber Strikes Deal 
with New York City Union to Create Driver Guild, FORTUNE (May, 10, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/05/10/uber-nyc-driver-guild/ [https://perma.cc/S6NY-3KSR]. 
 152. Kokalitcheva, supra note 151. 
 153. Cao & Newcomer, supra note 151. 
 154. Scheiber & Isaac, supra note 12. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Cao & Newcomer, supra note 151. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.  These lobbying efforts are discussed in greater detail below. See infra Part IV. 
 159. Cao & Newcomer, supra note 151. 
 160. Id. 
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ability to pause rider requests for a coffee or bathroom break.162  Drivers will 
also be paid for wait times that exceed two minutes163 and, in some markets, 
can receive other discounts.164  Moreover, drivers who are commuting may 
receive trip requests that occur only along their way home or to work.165  
Other changes include “in-app phone support, the ability to view earnings 
and be paid instantly from the app through an Uber debit card, and a fuel-
finder function that allows drivers to find the cheapest gas nearby.”166 
Uber is hoping to build a relationship with its drivers through the guild.167  
According to Uber, the agreement is part of an ongoing effort by the company 
to work more closely with drivers who use the Uber platform.168  The guild 
is purportedly a “win-win” for Uber and its workers—drivers receive a 
stronger voice while Uber prevents formal organization efforts and 
simultaneously adds a partner in its lobbying efforts for lower New York tax 
liability.169  Uber hopes to change the New York State law that levies almost 
a 9 percent tax on black-car rides but not taxis, which face only a fifty-cent 
surcharge.170  The IAM plans to assist Uber’s efforts to lobby the state 
legislature to “treat all hired vehicles equally.”171  Uber has stated that if the 
law changes, the company’s savings would flow to drivers and Uber would 
start a benefits fund that the guild would administer.172  A successful change 
in this area could result in various potential new benefits for drivers, 
including paid time off and retirement savings accounts.173 
Despite Uber’s positive outlook for the guild, the company maintains that 
it is not seeking to replicate the concept outside of the city.174  New York is 
a unique market for Uber since most drivers use the platform as a full-time 
(or close to full-time) employment opportunity.175  Even though the guild 
may not be implemented in other areas, it could nonetheless form part of a 
larger strategy for building the new workforce in the gig economy.176 
 
 162. Faiz Siddiqui, Uber Launches New Features Aimed at Improving Driver Experience, 
WASH. POST (June 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2016/06/ 
07/uber-launches-new-features-aimed-at-improving-driver-experience [https://perma.cc/ 
LUA8-P754]. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.  The company is experimenting with these discounts in several cities before 
deciding whether to make them permanent. Id.  Uber provides these discounts to drivers by 
decreasing the commission percentage it takes out of a driver’s fare. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Plouffe, supra note 148. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Cao & Newcomer, supra note 151. 
 170. Scheiber & Isaac, supra note 12. 
 171. Id.  See generally Anne E. Polivka, A Profile of Contingent Workers, MONTHLY LAB. 
REV., Oct. 1996, at 10. 
 172. Scheiber & Isaac, supra note 12. 
 173. See generally id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id.  Note that when drivers use Uber as their primary source of employment, it 
increases the likelihood that they will be considered employees rather than independent 
contractors. See Corp. Express Delivery Sys., 332 N.L.R.B. 1522, 1522 (2000). 
 176. Scheiber & Isaac, supra note 12.  The Independent Drivers Guild may stay in New 
York City exclusively for Uber drivers; however, there are hopes that the guild will spread to 
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Uber has also teamed up with the Freelancers Union to ensure better 
relations with drivers.  Uber has stated that the “Freelancers Union, a 
longtime leader in advocating for independent workers, will advise Uber on 
how to best bring flexible benefits to independent workers in the on-demand 
economy.”177  These worker-friendly changes, along with the 
implementation of the guild, further Uber’s objective of ameliorating the 
existing tensions with drivers while maintaining the company’s platform, 
ideals, and cost structure. 
G.  Other Attempts at Quasi-Union Arrangements 
The Uber Guild is a unique organization that has been tailored to fit the 
particular concerns raised by the structure of the working relationship of the 
company with its drivers.  While limited, there have been other attempts to 
provide workers in non-gig sectors with benefits and representation outside 
of the traditional union setting.  This Article sets forth two such examples 
below. 
1.  The GE Ombudsperson Process 
Although many of General Electric’s (GE) workers are represented by 
traditional unions,178 the company has created an ombudsperson process for 
individuals to ask questions and report integrity concerns.179  GE employs 
approximately 600 ombudspersons for all of its businesses.180  GE workers 
become familiar with their local and regional ombudsperson through 
“frequent communications, articles and various Company intranet sites.”181  
The GE ombudsperson process allows workers to voice their integrity 
questions and concerns, anonymously if they choose, and to avoid concerns 
over retaliation.182 
Due to General Electric’s global presence, ombudspersons “speak the local 
language and understand the culture and business environment of their 
locations.”183  Ombudspersons undergo training to learn “procedures for 
receiving concerns, initiating investigations and monitoring case progress 
and closure.”184  Furthermore, “[o]mbudspersons are introduced at all 
 
other independent contractors in various locations. Foster, supra note 11.  Although the future 
is unknown, the guild has sparked some positive reactions. See id.  The New York state 
president of the AFL-CIO stated that the guild could become a “model for other states.” Cao 
& Newcomer, supra note 151. 
 177. Plouffe, supra note 148. 
 178. See generally Why Union?, GEN. ELECTRIC WORKERS UNITED, 
http://www.geworkersunited.org/why [https://perma.cc/4B5A-E4TE] (last visited Feb. 14, 
2018). 
 179. GE Investors, GE , http://www.ge.com/investor-relations/governance/ombudsperson-
process [https://perma.cc/VU8F-ZPU3] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).  The ombudsman program 
has evolved since the research performed for this Article, and will likely continue to be refined 
by the company. See generally id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Gen. Electric Co., Annual Report exhibit 14.2, at 3(Form 10-K) (June 2005). 
 183. GE Investors, supra note 179. 
 184. Id. 
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employee meetings within the businesses and regions, including integrity 
events and trainings.”185 
GE’s website provides an online form to submit “an Ombuds concern” by 
filling out an integrity questionnaire.186  In 2015, workers reported 3844 
integrity concerns through the ombudsperson process.187  All concerns raised 
go through the ombudsperson process, which includes an investigation.188  
The investigation process includes “assigning an investigation team,” 
“conducting an investigation,” “corrective action,” and “feedback.”189  The 
process does not provide any formal union protections, but the ombudsperson 
program does provide clear benefits to employees.  The company maintains 
that “[t]he GE Ombudsperson process allows [workers] to voice [their] 
integrity questions and concerns . . . and [they] will receive a response.”190  
The goal of the “open reporting environment” is to encourage employees to 
report without fear of retaliation and for employees to “remain the 
Company’s first and best line of defense for the early detection of potential 
compliance issues.”191  Each year, “fair employment practices” comprise the 
majority of concerns reported through the ombudsperson process.192 
2.  Volkswagen “Minority Union” Agreement 
In 2014, the United Auto Workers (UAW) lost a union representation 
election at the Volkswagen (VW) Chattanooga plant in Tennessee.193  In late 
2014, VW implemented a “Community Engagement Program.”194  As part 
of the program, VW agreed to hold three meetings each month with the UAW 
despite the UAW’s failed attempt to unionize VW’s employees.195  The 
meetings provide a “forum for the UAW to raise workplace issues, ranging 
from who works the graveyard shift to how much work the company gives 
lower-paid temps.”196  The policy attracted widespread media attention, with 
headlines that included “Minority Unionism (Sort of) Comes to VW 
 
 185. Integrity & Compliance:  A Strong Culture of Integrity, GE, 
http://www.gesustainability.com/how-ge-works/integrity-compliance/a-strong-culture-of-
integrity/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20160417014008/http://www.gesustainability.com/ 
how-ge-works/integrity-compliance/a-strong-culture-of-integrity/]. 
 186. Raise an Ombuds Concern, GE.COM, http://www.geenergyconnections.com/raise-
ombuds-concern [https://perma.cc/9CAD-R5BV] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 187. GE Investors, supra note 179. 
 188. Gen. Electric Co., supra note 182. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2012) (providing an exception to a company union 
ban:  “an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him 
during working hours without loss of time or pay”). 
 191. GE Investors, supra note 179. 
 192. Id.  The online report does not provide a specific definition as to what type of worker 
conduct or concerns would specifically fall under the umbrella of “fair employment practices.” 
See id. 
 193. Josh Eidelson, Union-ish:  VW and UAW Are Odd Bedfellows at a Southern U.S. 
Plant, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 19, 2015, at 21. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
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Chattanooga,”197 and “Volkswagen’s Sort-of Union in Tennessee.”198  The 
program thus immediately became controversial based on its structure and 
the benefits provided to workers as part of the policy. 
The arrangement between the UAW and VW is a form of “unionization-
lite” in which “VW certified that the UAW represents at least 45 percent of 
its hourly employees.”199  Under the program, groups that VW has certified 
as representing 15 percent or 30 percent of employees also meet with VW, 
but less often.200  Labor activists hope that the arrangement will grow into a 
“minority union” arrangement, “where a union represents and negotiates 
contracts for those employees who sign up, whether or not it has majority 
support.”201 
The policy does not establish a “true minority unionism at 
Volkswagen.”202  The policy also does not include any actual bargaining 
obligations, and VW is only required to “meet” with the organizations to 
listen to their concerns.203  In addition, the policy allows employees to 
“[d]iscuss and/or promote their interests.”204  Although the new policy does 
not establish a traditional union for workers, it does attempt to build a strong 
relationship between VW Chattanooga and its employees.205  Although the 
door has not been opened all the way, labor leaders are hopeful that this 
policy might eventually grow into a “‘minority union’ arrangement.”206 
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month with the Executive Committee and biweekly with Human Resources. Id. 
 201. Eidelson, supra note 193. 
 202. Sachs, supra note 197. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Volkswagen, supra note 200, at 2. 
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Talks, Meetings with UAW and ACE, TIMES FREE PRESS (Tenn.) (Nov. 13, 2014), 
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregion/story/2014/nov/13/labor-
groups-support-new-vw-policyvolkswagen/273310/ [https://perma.cc/W5EZ-MR5S]. 
 206. Eidelson, supra note 193.  A “minority union agreement” would have to be limited to 
employees who agreed to have the union act as their representative; section 8(a)(2) prevents 
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Garment Workers’ Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 737–38 (1961); infra Part III. 
1756 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
With the exception of the United States, China, and Russia, VW 
implements local “works councils” in its operations worldwide.207  The 
works councils provide elected blue-collar employees to have a voice in 
management and company policies.208  Although both the UAW and VW 
have embraced the idea of bringing the works-council model to the United 
States, federal law prohibiting “company-dominated” unions hinders such an 
arrangement.209 
Despite the cooperative agreement between VW and the UAW, their 
relationship has cooled of late.  In December 2015, a small group of VW 
workers—around 160 skilled tradesmen—voted in favor of UAW 
representation.210  Shortly thereafter, the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) certified the election results.211  The UAW and VW have been 
embroiled in a dispute over how to proceed with union representation since 
the election.212  VW appealed the decision to the NLRB and refused to 
recognize the skilled tradesmen as a collective bargaining unit while the 
appeal was pending.213  The UAW then sued VW for unfair labor practices 
alleging that VW unlawfully refused “to negotiate on a labor contract with 
[the] newly formed bargaining unit.”214  The NLRB ultimately rejected VW’s 
request to review the decision, but VW has yet to recognize the unit and begin 
labor negotiations.215  In August 2016, the NLRB ordered VW to open 
bargaining talks with the unit.216  However, instead of complying with the 
NLRB’s order, VW chose to pursue an appeal through a federal appellate 
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court.217 The D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the NLRB for 
reconsideration in light of a recent NLRB decision.218 
III.  HELPING EMPLOYERS HELP EMPLOYEES:  
WORKPLACE PARTICIPATION GROUPS 
As previously discussed, quasi-union arrangements often benefit from the 
participation of traditional unions but can succeed independently of them.  
However, one quasi-union strategy that requires some degree of union 
participation or acquiescence is the expansion of “employee participation 
groups.”  These are groups that are housed at a specific workplace and that 
provide employees with a means to give input to their employers.219  Many 
employee participation groups already exist but often operate illegally.220  
Unions could enhance their existence in many ways, although they have been 
resistant to such efforts thus far. 
One of the Wagner Act’s original provisions was a ban on “company 
unions.”  At the time, many employers created and dominated so-called 
“unions” that purported to represent employees but were often intended to 
weaken employees’ desire and ability to seek truly independent 
representation.221  To combat this problem, Congress added section 8(a)(2), 
which makes it unlawful for an employer to dominate or interfere with any 
labor organization.222 
One of the key conditions for a section 8(a)(2) violation is that the work 
group at issue qualify as a “labor organization” as defined by section 2(5).223  
Under section 2(5), a group will be considered a labor organization if it has 
employee participation and its purpose is to deal with an employer over terms 
and conditions of work.224  The NLRB has expansively interpreted section 
2(5), particularly the requirement that a labor organization have the purpose 
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of “dealing with” an employer.  According to the NLRB, “dealing with” is 
defined as a bilateral process or a “pattern or practice in which a group of 
employees, over time, makes proposals to management, management 
responds to these proposals by acceptance or rejection by word or deed, and 
compromise is not required.”225  Moreover, under NLRB jurisprudence, a 
group can be a labor organization even if it lacks a formal structure; has no 
elected officers, bylaws, regular meetings, or dues; and its discussions with 
an employer fall far short of traditional collective bargaining.226  As 
discussed below, section 2(5) has far-reaching effects on nontraditional 
worker groups,227 including the result that an employer cannot provide any 
support to or exercise control over a group considered a labor organization 
without violating section 8(a)(2).228  However, employers could lawfully 
form or support a group made up of workers who are not classified as 
employees under the NLRA; thus, independent contractors and other 
similarly situated gig workers have an opportunity for cooperation with their 
employers that workers classified as employees lack. 
The general debate over section 8(a)(2) and calls for its reform are well 
known.229  This Article does not revisit this discussion; instead, it argues that 
section 8(a)(2) represents another area in which a more cooperative approach 
could be beneficial to unions—not to mention employees and employers.  
Unions have strongly objected to attempts to narrow section 8(a)(2)’s 
reach,230 but reconsideration of that stance may now be appropriate. 
Surveys have demonstrated that there is an unmet demand for employee 
voice (or participation) at work.231  Employees overwhelmingly want more 
opportunities to provide input on business operations and to discuss working 
conditions with their employers.232  Employers also frequently recognize the 
value in certain types of employee participation, particularly as the economy 
relies more on jobs that require independent thinking.233  For instance, 
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employee input can improve productivity and morale, as well as provide a 
better way to address workplace grievances.234  As a result, many—although 
certainly not all—managers have expressed their support for allowing some 
form of employee voice in the workplace.235 
Although the desires of employers and employees are not always 
congruent—an employer may want employee input on production operations 
but not on working conditions—there is often enough overlap that some 
increase in employee participation and voice could be achieved.  That is, of 
course, if section 8(a)(2) did not prohibit most employee participation groups.  
The breadth of section 8(a)(2), or more specifically the breadth of section 
2(5)’s definition of a “labor organization” that an employer is not allowed to 
dominate or support, allows for little experimentation—it is largely a choice 
between traditional union representation or nothing at all.236  Because 
employers will often take the lead in organizing these groups, section 
8(a)(2)’s expansive reach means that these groups cannot be created lawfully.  
The result is an unmet demand for employee participation and voice.  
However, this unmet demand is not as dire as it initially seems. 
Despite the potential of an unfair-labor-practice finding, it appears that 
employers frequently use employee participation groups that may violate 
section 8(a)(2)—likely reflecting the potential advantages for employers and 
the weak remedies found in the NLRA.237  There is significant variety in the 
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Twenty-First Century, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 198–200 (2001).  But see DAVID I. 
LEVINE, REINVENTING THE WORKPLACE:  HOW BUSINESS AND EMPLOYEES CAN BOTH WIN 63 
(1995) (noting that “[m]any middle- and lower-level managers resist and sometimes sabotage 
employee involvement” because greater employee autonomy “may be threatening to 
supervisors and managers”). 
 236. See Estlund, supra note 234, at 1546.  Some exceptions exist, such as where an 
employer gives an employee group virtually full decision-making authority over certain topics. 
See Crown Cork & Seal Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 699, 699 (2001).  But employers will often be 
reluctant to delegate this degree of control to employees. 
 237. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 231, at 119, 120; LEVINE, supra note 235, at 7 
(citing a 1990 study of Fortune 1000 companies); Orley Lobel & Anne Marie Lofaso, Systems 
of Employee Representation:  The US Report, in SYSTEMS OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION AT 
THE ENTERPRISE:  A COMPARATIVE STUDY 205, 208 (Roger Blanpain et al. eds., 2012) (citing 
studies); Estlund, supra note 50, at 468; John Godard & Carola Frege, Labor Unions, 
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form that these groups can take, as well as in the amount of employee 
participation and topics they consider, such as self-managed employee teams 
and quality circles that focus on production rather than work conditions; 
quality of work or employee-action committees that often focus on safety, 
grievances, and other human resource issues; employee caucuses that 
promote better work conditions; and profit-sharing groups, like employee 
stock ownership plans, that usually lack decision-making authority.238  Many 
of these groups appear to involve input about working conditions and—
perhaps not surprisingly, given that one would expect less hostile employers 
to be more open to meaningful employee input—employees generally have 
favorable views of the groups.239 
Expanding the opportunity for employee participation groups, in addition 
to removing the specter of illegality on those that currently exist, is 
challenging but certainly not hopeless.  Because many employers want some 
form of employee voice—enough so that many willingly violate the law to 
get it—the normal alliances are turned upside down.  It is largely unions that 
oppose reform, while employers are more aligned with the general sentiment 
of employees.  That is not to say that unions and others who oppose 
weakening section 8(a)(2) have no justification for their position; the 
potential harm of company unions and the risk that even more benevolent 
employee participation groups may create a misleading façade of 
participation is quite real.240  But the unusual alignment between employees 
and employers on this issue produces a potential for compromise. 
Unions need to ask themselves how much they really object to section 
8(a)(2) reform.  In particular, they should consider whether acceding to some 
changes in section 8(a)(2) could provide benefits that outweigh the feared 
costs of reform.  Those benefits could come in the form of other legislative 
changes as well as the ability to promote a more cooperative image and 
relationship with other labor law actors. 
 
Alternative Forms of Representation, and the Exercise of Authority Relations in U.S. 
Workplaces, 66 ILR REV. 142, 151–52 (2013) (showing that approximately one-third of 
surveyed nonunion employees report some form of employer-created representation group); 
Bruce E. Kaufman, Does the NLRA Constrain Employee Involvement and Participation 
Programs in Nonunion Companies?:  A Reassessment, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 729, 747, 
776–77 (1999) (describing evidence showing that some employers knowingly operate legally 
suspect employee participation groups because of weak penalties and low risk of section 
8(a)(2) violation).  But see Kaufman, supra, at 753, 777–78 (describing managers who want 
to avoid section 8(a)(2) litigation and give unions an opportunity to file unfair labor practice 
charges). 
 238. Lobel & Lofaso, supra note 237, at 224; see also Estreicher, supra note 221, at 127 
(describing different types of employee participation groups). 
 239. See Godard & Frege, supra note 237, at 153. 
 240. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 992–94 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 
(7th Cir. 1994); Estreicher, supra note 221, at 129–33; Hyde, supra note 221, at 174–76 
(discussing the possible rationales of section 8(a)(2)); Michael H. LeRoy, Employee 
Participation in the New Millennium:  Redefining a Labor Organization Under Section 8(a)(2) 
of the NLRA, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1651, 1661–62 (1999) (noting that many early twentieth-
century employee participation groups were progressive, but other employers created such 
groups in anticipation of federal labor legislation and in the hopes of barring independent 
unions from the workplace). 
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If a compromise on section 8(a)(2) reform occurred—a political long shot, 
to be sure—what might it look like?241  There is general agreement that the 
prohibition against the most pernicious of company unions, such as sham 
organizations that employers use to prevent independent unions or to trick 
employees into believing that they have real representation, should be 
maintained.242  But section 8(a)(2) bans organizations that fall short of that 
concern, leaving ample room for far more narrow coverage that would still 
respect the provision’s central policy concerns.243  This would be especially 
true if an employer’s ability to create an employee participation group was 
tied to the lack of significant labor law violations.244 
Unions have opposed narrowing section 8(a)(2) in part because of their 
fear that employer-initiated employee participation groups will compete with 
traditional unions and mislead employees regarding the actual independence 
of their representation.245  Those fears are not unfounded, but they may be 
exaggerated and stand in the way of an opportunity worth pursuing.  The risk 
of employees being misled about the true nature of their representation is a 
serious concern, but one that could be addressed by adding information 
requirements to a limited reform measure—such as requiring employers that 
use employee participation groups to inform workers of employer 
involvement and their right to join an independent union. 
Moreover, it is difficult to believe that allowing more employer-initiated 
employee groups would make union density drop substantially below its 
current historical low.  To the contrary, there are valid arguments that the 
expansion of these groups would actually lead to greater unionization.  For 
instance, employee participation groups might spur more interest in 
traditional unionization as employees have positive experiences with 
 
 241. Duff, supra note 51, at 875–76 (proposing a union-employer compromise). 
 242. For instance, the Republican-introduced TEAM Act would have created a proviso to 
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enter into collective bargaining agreements with the employer or to amend existing 
collective bargaining agreements between the employer and any labor organization, 
except . . . a case in which a labor organization is the representative of such 
employees as provided in section 9(a). 
Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act, H.R. 743, 104th Cong. (1996).  The House and 
Senate passed the TEAM Act, which President Clinton vetoed. See 142 CONG. REC. H8816 
(daily ed. July 30, 1996). 
 243. See Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 127, at 1158–59; see also Estlund, supra note 50, at 
486 (arguing for a legislative “co-regulation” program, which would include collective 
participation of employees and for employers that self-regulate in good faith); Estreicher, 
supra note 221, at 150 (proposing a change to section 2(5)’s definition of “labor 
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 244. Estlund, supra note 50, at 489. 
 245. See Jonathan P. Hiatt & Laurence E. Gold, Employer-Employee Committees:  A Union 
Perspective, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION:  HISTORY, CONTEMPORARY 
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 498, 507–08 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Daphne Gottlieb Taras eds., 2000). 
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collective participation in the workplace.246  As a result, these groups could 
represent potential organization targets for unions.247  Employee 
participation groups could also spur unions to improve, which may make 
them more attractive to employees.248  Indeed, most other countries with 
developed labor laws lack section 8(a)(2)’s prohibition against nonunion 
employee participation groups yet have union density rates that are far greater 
than what is found in the United States.249  Many countries also require 
employee representation in some form.250  As a final matter, the reality is that 
many of these groups already exist (often illegally),251 so it is unclear how 
much advantage flows to unions by keeping the broad but weak section 
8(a)(2) unchanged. 
Unions, of course, are well aware of these considerations and still believe 
that the uncertainties of section 8(a)(2) reform outweigh the need to change 
a status quo that does not appear to have hurt them.  But the potential benefits 
of cooperation may be a less obvious, or at least more discounted, factor.  In 
addition to the potential gains resulting from a hypothetical legislative 
compromise, unions could see benefits flow from a less hostile stance toward 
employee participation groups.  For instance, employers’ resistance to 
unionization could decline if they have a positive experience with an 
employee participation group.252 
 
 246. See Barenberg, supra note 234, at 831–35 (discussing pre-NLRA company labor 
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in part from company unions.”); LeRoy, supra note 240, at 1702, 1710–11; Summers, supra 
note 234, at 138 (arguing that employers’ ability to fight unionization under current law may 
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 248. Estlund, supra note 234, at 1544, 1551, 1601 (arguing that employee work groups 
could spur innovation among unions); cf. Kye D. Pawlenko, Reevaluating Inter-Union 
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88 (2006) (arguing that increased interunion competition will lead to increased union 
membership). 
 249. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 27, 2012 O.J. C 
326/391, at 401; Samuel Estreicher, Nonunion Employee Representation:  A Legal/Policy 
Perspective, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 245, at 196, 196; Dau-
Schmidt, supra note 233, at 811–19 (discussing “coordinated market economies,” like 
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 250. Estlund, supra note 50, at 468. 
 251. See supra Part II (discussing various alt-labor arrangements). 
 252. Employers in countries that encourage or require employee work groups typically 
have favorable, or at least lack an unfavorable, view of these groups. See Summers, supra note 
234, at 132–33; see also CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM:  EMPLOYEE 
INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHANGING CORPORATION 177–231 (1988); LEVINE, supra note 235, at 
3–4, 115–21.  This does not necessarily translate into support for traditional, independent 
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In the unlikely event that legislative reform is possible,253 unions need 
not—indeed, should not—open the door to section 8(a)(2) reform 
unconditionally.  For instance, narrowing section 8(a)(2) in exchange for 
allowing the NLRB to issue fines, which is particularly important in cases 
that do not involve direct financial harm, may be a worthwhile tradeoff for 
unions.  Similarly, strengthening enforcement against unlawful terminations, 
expanding unions’ organizing capabilities (such as increasing access to 
employees and decreasing election delays), and developing more types of 
injunctive relief could also be bargaining chips.254  Some employer groups 
may be open to these types of trade-offs, especially representatives of the 
largest employers, which are better able to create and enjoy the benefits of 
employee groups.  This sweet spot may be illusory, but it is certainly an effort 
worth pursuing.255 
If, as is likely in the short term, legislative reform is unattainable, unions 
could help implement de facto reform.  For employers that are interested in 
employee input and participation and that are not overly hostile to union 
involvement, a potential compromise exists:  an employer can avoid section 
8(a)(2) liability if its employee group is created or partially run by an outside 
union or other employee group.256  The most straightforward means of 
achieving this status is the voluntary recognition of a union that has agreed 
to limit its bargaining rights with a prerecognition framework agreement.257  
That option has its limits, primarily because many employers will not be 
willing to recognize a union simply to avoid a potential section 8(a)(2) 
violation that has little cost. 
But there are alternatives such an arrangement.  For instance, unions or 
quasi-union entities could help establish employee work groups in places 
where there are no formal collective-bargaining representatives.  If the 
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immigration reform.  This is not a perfect comparison but one that suggests a possible 
realignment. 
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 256. See generally supra Part I (discussing the union approach at Volkswagen). 
 257. A prerecognition framework agreement is an agreement between a union and an 
employer that outlines basic principles that will govern their future relationship if the union 
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recognize the union if it gets majority support.  The NLRB recently clarified when such 
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determine whether agreement represents unlawful employer support under section 8(a)(2)), 
enforced sub nom. Montague v. NLRB, 698 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Samuel 
Estreicher, Essay, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform:  Opening Up the Possibilities 
for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 834–39 (1996); Martin H. Malin, The 
Canadian Auto Workers-Magna International, Inc. Framework of Fairness Agreement:  A 
U.S. Perspective, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 525, 530 (2010). 
1764 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
employer does not create an employee group or otherwise unlawfully support 
it, section 8(a)(2) is not implicated.258  Moreover, unions—or a quasi-union 
like Working America—could simply provide information and assistance to 
employees interested in gaining more input at work.  If these employees work 
for a firm that is sympathetic to increased employee voice, the employer can 
agree to discuss issues once the group is formed.  As long as the employer 
does not recognize the group as a collective-bargaining representative and 
does not provide other unlawful domination or interference, there will 
generally be no section 8(a)(2) violation. 
Whether unions will rethink their opposition to section 8(a)(2) reform 
remains an open question.  But they need not go as far as supporting 
legislation to test the waters.  Exploring opportunities to support employee 
participation groups could provide unions with more control over groups that 
already exist, remove some uncertainty about the effects of these groups, and 
provide opportunities for more cooperation with employers.  These possible 
effects, in addition to others discussed, hold promise for unions and near-
certain benefits for the largest employers who want more participation and 
voice in their workplaces. 
If unions do not explore these options, they may find that the ship will sail 
without them.  The desire of both employees and many employers to permit 
more voice at work can certainly enjoy the aid of unions but may not need 
unions to expand such opportunities.  For instance, Professor Cynthia Estlund 
has discussed the possibility that corporate employers will internalize support 
for workplace democracy, much as they have done for diversity efforts.259  
As she rightly notes, however, employer antipathy for organized labor means 
that corporate citizenship will never embrace workers’ right to voice if it is 
tied exclusively to the process of formal unionization.260  Instead, nonunion 
groups, such as progressive companies and coalitions of quasi-unions, are 
more likely to play the primary role in changing corporate culture to favor 
workplace democracy.261  Unions can and should be involved with such 
efforts, but it will require them to put their traditional collective bargaining 
interests to the side at times.262  If they fail to do so and other groups 
successfully push corporations to internalize workplace democracy, then 
unions risk further marginalizing themselves. 
 
 258. Nonunion groups could also perform similar functions, although unions are likely to 
be more effective. Cf. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE:  FROM SELF-
REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION 179 (2010); Cynthia Estlund, Employment Rights and 
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 259. See Estlund, supra note 48, at 179–80. 
 260. Id. at 180. 
 261. See id. at 179. 
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funding. See Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 93 (2016) (noting that the 
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The strength of employees’ desire for workplace voice, and the desire of 
many employers to listen to their employees, makes the possibility of 
increased workplace democracy real.  A significant number of employers are 
using worker participation groups, even though many of them are illegal 
under section 8(a)(2).263  Moreover, attempts to repeal section 8(a)(2) have 
already come close to succeeding.264  Thus, it would be no surprise to see 
legal change in this area.  The question is how such change will occur.  Will 
unions continue to fight any modification of the employee participation rules, 
or will they try to influence the direction of future reform?  Will quasi-unions 
see workplace democracy as a goal worth the fight?  Employers seem to have 
already concluded that workplace voice should be expanded and, given the 
current political environment, the chances are that they will ultimately be able 
to effect change.  Unions and other proemployee groups should ensure that 
they have influence over that process.  If not, the resulting law may be as bad 
as some of them fear and fail to accomplish the hopeful goals that workplace 
democracy promises. 
IV.  THE KNIFE’S EDGE:  NAVIGATING THE LEGAL BOUNDARIES OF 
TRADITIONAL AND NONTRADITIONAL WORKER REPRESENTATION 
Given the currently poor prospects for traditional union collective 
bargaining, organizations that serve employees through other means may 
hold particular promise.  Although generally not an equal substitute for 
unions’ advocacy and influence over working conditions, these quasi-union 
worker representation organizations can still provide benefits to employees 
through other means, such as the provision of services, sharing useful 
employment-related information, and assisting employee attempts to engage 
in collective activity.265  They might also breathe some new life into 
organized labor.  If the Wagner model of collective bargaining has been 
failing workers and unions, then seeking alternatives could help both groups. 
The problem with traditional organizing and collective bargaining has not 
gone unnoticed by unions,266 which have increasingly explored new ways to 
organize and represent workers.  For example, the Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU) implemented a successful Justice for Janitors 
campaign in Southern California by focusing heavily on the workers’ 
Mexican culture and seeking assistance from local religious and political 
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 264. See Whitney, supra note 17, at 1510 (“Both narrowing and repealing sections 8(a)(2) 
directly were . . . proposed by scholars in the 1990s.”). 
 265. See Secunda, supra note 15, at 579–81.  One limited—and less cooperative—example 
is coworker.org, which assists worker attempts to organize coworkers to make demands on 
their employers and which, among other things, provides access to similar attempts in the same 
industry, region, and other divisions. See id. at 575–77. 
 266. See supra Part II. 
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leaders.267  As part of that effort, the SEIU also used a public relations 
campaign that took advantage of the fact that many of the janitorial 
companies’ clients were well-known retailers.  By leading highly publicized 
demonstrations and boycotts against clients like Apple, the union was able to 
exert more pressure on the primary employer than would normally be 
possible.268  But a more radical change in strategy may be warranted. 
As the Uber Guild and other examples show, quasi-union worker 
representation groups can achieve gains for workers by being more service 
oriented toward members and working with employers to find ways to 
achieve gains for both employers and their workers.269  Cooperative 
strategies will not always be successful or appropriate, but these 
nontraditional groups are particularly suited to take advantage of instances 
where they would be beneficial. 
By providing previously unorganized workers with some level of voice 
and representation, nontraditional groups could provide significant 
opportunities for this large segment of the workforce.  The degree of voice 
and representation may be less than what would occur under a formal, 
traditional collective-bargaining relationship, but in most cases 
nontraditional representation will produce far more benefits for workers than 
currently exist.  This is especially true for the many contingent workers in 
technology and other fields, like Uber drivers, who may not be classified as 
employees under workplace statutes.  For these workers, as well as the vast 
majority of employees who are not unionized, their only opportunity for input 
on their work conditions exists at the whim of their employers.  Finding ways 
to fill the gap between workers’ overwhelming desire for voice270 and the 
current dearth of such opportunities should be a central priority for the labor 
movement. 
Beyond the direct advantages to providing workers with voice and 
representation, nontraditional strategies might provide long-term gains for 
collective representation generally.  As discussed earlier, the labor movement 
is suffering through a serious public relations problem, which has contributed 
to a sharp decline in unionization rates and increased legislative and judicial 
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barriers to organizing.271  Although it is unlikely that any strategy can 
substantially reverse these trends, increasing the number of workers who 
have experience with some form of collective bargaining is likely to help.  
These workers, as well as their friends and families, may acquire a “taste” for 
collective representation that could lead to higher unionization rates and more 
nontraditional representation.272  Additionally, if these nontraditional 
representation strategies prove beneficial for employers, or even less negative 
than they feared, then employer opposition to unions and other types of 
worker representation may shrink to some extent.273  More generally, as 
employers and workers gain a better view of workplace representation, the 
general public may be less solicitous of political attacks against unions and 
other proworker efforts. 
Beyond these strategic issues, however, is the impact of the law on worker 
representation groups.  Because nontraditional quasi-unions straddle the line 
between traditional unions and nonlabor membership organizations, the legal 
restrictions that apply are often unclear.  This lack of clarity typically results 
from the difficulty in determining whether a quasi-union should be classified 
as a labor organization, with the answer imposing significant legal 
consequences that will sharply affect the type of activities that the group can 
lawfully pursue.  For instance, groups that are not considered labor 
organizations can avoid many burdensome regulations governing traditional 
unions and can take advantage of certain types of pressure on employers that 
unions are prohibited from pursuing.  At the same time, avoiding the labor 
organization classification restricts groups’ ability to represent workers and 
potentially exposes them to antitrust liability.274  In other words, 
nontraditional groups act on a knife’s edge, on which a move in one direction 
can expose them to significant monetary or even criminal liability, while a 
move in the other direction makes them more like traditional unions and the 
shortcomings that such a designation entails. 
The modern economy holds great promise for nontraditional worker 
groups, but as we discuss below, the law has not kept up with changes in the 
technology sector and other similar industries.  Given the current political 
climate, it is not realistic to hope for legislative reforms; thus, nontraditional 
groups must be cognizant of the legal consequences of their actions and shape 
their organizational and representational strategies accordingly. 
A.  Potential Advantages of Nontraditional Strategies 
There are various legal advantages to nontraditional representation 
strategies over more formal union representation, particularly for workers in 
the technology sector.  These advantages generally stem from the possibility 
that most of these groups would avoid classification as a “labor organization” 
 
 271. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (discussing scholarship on this issue). 
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under the NLRA.275  For example, groups that are not classified as labor 
organizations under the statute can receive support from an employer without 
violating section 8(a)(2).276  In other words, groups that do not engage in 
bilateral bargaining over wages, hours, and terms and conditions of 
employment can currently provide workers with some degree of 
representation with an employers’ acquiescence.  Although not all employers 
will be willing to engage in this type of bargaining, for those that are, this 
quasi-union strategy provides workers with some degree of representation as 
well as the opportunity to engage in a more cooperative relationship with the 
employer. 
Despite its nontraditional nature, many of these quasi-unions may still 
enjoy traditional legal protections.  For instance, although the NLRA’s 
section 8(a)(1)277 antiretaliation protection for employee collective action is 
typically associated with union activity, it also applies to nonunion employee 
attempts to act together to improve their working conditions.278  Thus, even 
nonunionized employees who work with nontraditional groups or engage in 
activities to further their interests as employees will remain protected.  
However, workers who are not classified as employees lack this NLRA 
protection.  For these workers, collective action remains a serious threat to 
their job status.  This lack of protection can be a significant impediment to 
collective action, but it also illustrates the importance of efforts like the Uber 
Guild, which provide a more cooperative—and less risky—strategy for 
collective representation. 
Acting outside of the traditional legal framework can have potential 
liabilities,279 but there are numerous benefits as well.  In particular, 
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_new_model_of_representation._final_version_downloaded_2.20.14.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
9PTM-UX7X] (arguing that many work centers should be classified as traditional unions). 
 276. See supra Part III.  Of course, there may be a risk that an employer could attempt to 
use such a group as a “sham union,” but that risk is mitigated by limits on nonlabor 
organizations’ power to bargain under current law.  Even if section 8(a)(2) was amended to 
allow for more bargaining, limits on that expanded bargaining could protect against abuses. 
See supra Part III. 
 277. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012).  Section 7 of the NLRA protects employees’ right to 
“self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Id. § 157.  These section 
7 rights are enforced through section 8(a)(1), which states that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor 
practice for an employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of 
[their section 7] rights.” Id. § 158(a)(1). 
 278. See NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14–17 (1962) (holding that an 
employer violated section 8(a)(1) by firing nonunionized employees who participated in a 
walkout); Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 127, at 1162. 
 279. See infra Part IV.B. 
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nontraditional groups may be able to avoid some of the more restrictive limits 
placed on traditional unions.  Three of the most significant of these 
restrictions are possible limits on agreements with employers, recordkeeping 
and structural organizational requirements, and prohibitions against various 
types of employer pressure. 
1.  Avoiding Section 302 Attacks on Cooperative Agreements 
Nontraditional groups whose actions put them outside of section 2(5)’s 
definition of a labor organization will have greater freedom to cooperate with 
employers.  In particular, these quasi-unions will likely be able to avoid 
certain legal challenges to any agreements they secure with employers.  Chief 
among these challenges is the claim that an agreement violates section 302 
of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA or “Taft-Hartley Act”).280  
Antilabor organizations and workers have been increasingly using this 
provision to attack agreements between unions and employers. 
Under section 302(a), it is unlawful for an employer to provide 
“any . . . thing of value” to a labor organization or representative of its 
employees.281  This provision is primarily intended to prohibit employer 
bribes of union officials,282 but dissenting employees, often acting with 
antiunion groups, have used private rights of action under section 302 to 
argue for an expansion of its scope.283  This expansive interpretation of 
section 302 could be a significant barrier to traditional union organizing and, 
in turn, represent an advantage of nontraditional representation efforts. 
The recent section 302 strategy centers on the argument that this provision 
extends beyond traditional bribery and extortion to include actions such as an 
employer promise to a union that it will remain neutral in an organizing 
 
 280. 29 U.S.C. § 186. 
 281. Id. § 186(a).  This provision states that: 
It shall be unlawful for any employer or association of employers or any person who 
acts as a labor relations expert, adviser, or consultant to an employer or who acts in 
the interest of an employer to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, 
any money or other thing of value— 
(1) to any representative of any of his employees who are employed in an industry 
affecting commerce; or  
(2) to any labor organization, or any officer or employee thereof, which 
represents, seeks to represent, or would admit to membership, any of the 
employees of such employer who are employed in an industry affecting 
commerce; . . . .  
Id. 
 282. Toth v. USX Corp., 883 F.2d 1297, 1300 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[A] central purpose of 
section 302 . . . was to prevent employers from bribing union officials.”); Turner v. Local 
Union No. 302, 604 F.2d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 1979) (“The dominant purpose of § 302 is to 
prevent employers from tampering with the loyalty of union officials and to prevent union 
officials from extorting tribute from employers.”). 
 283. See Nicholas M. Ohanesian, Does “Why” or “What” Matter:  Should Section 302 
Apply to Card Check Neutrality Agreements?, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 249, 250–53, 257–61 
(2014) (discussing the history of section 302 through Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall, 134 S. 
Ct. 594 (2013) (per curiam)).  Whether that private right of action still exists is more of an 
open question. See infra note 294.  However, violations of section 302 are also considered 
criminal and may be a felony. 29 U.S.C. § 186(d) (outlining criminal penalties). 
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campaign; that it will voluntarily recognize the union if it achieves majority 
support; or that it will abide by other ground rules, such as providing access 
to the employer’s premises.284  In the past, courts have rejected claims that 
such promises are a “thing of value” under section 302.285  However, in 
Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355,286 the Eleventh Circuit appeared to open 
the door to such claims.  In Mulhall, the court held that an employer’s 
promise to remain neutral during organizing drives,287 among other 
assistance, could be considered a “thing of value.”288 
Union opponents heralded the Mulhall decision as a legal tool to attack the 
use of neutrality and similar agreements between employers and unions, 
especially after the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.289  Unions, in 
turn, were alarmed by Mulhall—so much so that they also sought 
certiorari.290  However, both sides may have placed too much weight on the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision; while it certainly opened the door wider to 
section 302 claims, the court also seemed to limit potential liability to 
employer promises that amounted to corruption or extortion.291  That said, 
the fact that the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case raised a genuine 
possibility that it would help usher in a new type of attack on union 
organizing. 
Despite its promise as a potential labor law blockbuster, Mulhall ultimately 
ended with a whimper when the Court dismissed the case as improvidently 
granted.292  Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court maintains—and potentially 
 
 284. See, e.g., Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012); 
Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 371 (4th Cir. 2008); Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. 
Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hosp. Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 207–08 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 285. See, e.g., Adcock, 550 F.3d at 377; Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 57, 390 
F.3d at 218–19. 
 286. 667 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 287. Id. at 1213 (“Mardi Gras promised to (1) provide union representatives access to non-
public work premises to organize employees during non-work hours; (2) provide the union a 
list of employees, their job classifications, departments, and addresses; and (3) remain neutral 
to the unionization of employees.  In return, Unite promised to lend financial support to a 
ballot initiative regarding casino gaming.”). 
 288. Id. at 1215 (“It seems apparent that organizing assistance can be a thing of 
value . . . .”). 
 289. See Sean P. Redmond, Supreme Court Considers NLRA Case (“Mulhall Case”), U.S. 
CHAMBER COM. (Jan. 18, 2013, 4:29 PM), https://www.uschamber.com/article/supreme-court-
considers-nlra-case-mulhall-case [https://perma.cc/YPB3-DX3N]. 
 290. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari by Unite Here at 1, Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall, 
134 S. Ct. 594 (2013) (No. 12-99), 2012 WL 3027183. 
 291. Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1215 (“If employers offer organizing assistance with the intention 
of improperly influencing a union, then the policy concerns in § 302—curbing bribery and 
extortion—are implicated.  It is too broad to hold that all neutrality and cooperation 
agreements are exempt from the prohibitions in § 302.  Employers and unions may set ground 
rules for an organizing campaign, even if the employer and union benefit from the agreement.  
But innocuous ground rules can become illegal payments if used as valuable consideration in 
a scheme to corrupt a union or to extort a benefit from an employer.”). 
 292. Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall, 134 S. Ct. 594, 594 (2013) (per curiam).  According 
to Justice Breyer’s dissent, dismissal was warranted due to questions of mootness (the 
employer-union agreement at issue had expired) and standing (Mulhall, the dissenting 
employee, had worked in a right-to-work state and, therefore, did not have to pay any dues to 
the union). Id. at 595 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, 618 
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expands—its conservative bent under the new administration, we can expect 
to see this issue before the Court again.  If it follows Mulhall’s lead, or pushes 
the interpretation of section 302 further, the Court could severely limit a 
union’s ability to cooperate with employers, which they have increasingly 
done in organizing drives.293  In the meantime, parties will likely continue to 
argue that section 302 should be broadly interpreted to cover neutrality and 
other similar promises.294  We might see arguments that other types of 
agreements violate section 302, such as employer promises to provide appeal 
rights from certain workplace actions—like being dismissed from the Uber 
platform—or to have periodic meetings with the company.295 
The Uber Guild agreement implicates many of these potential section 302 
promises, but the group and others like it should have little to fear.  Indeed, 
the ability to mitigate the risk of such claims represents one of the advantages 
of nontraditional representation groups because the distinguishing features 
that make them nontraditional also serve to inoculate them from section 302 
liability.  First, if a group represents workers who are not classified as 
employees, then section 302—by its own terms—does not apply.296  Second, 
even if a group represents workers who are classified as employees, the group 
would likely still avoid liability as long as it is not categorized as a traditional 
labor organization under section 2(5) of the NLRA.297  In other words, as 
 
F.3d 1279, 1286–90 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing the standing issue and holding that standing 
existed); Thomas W. Frampton, Neutrality Agreements and Article III Standing:  Why Unite 
Here Local 355 v. Mulhall Is Nonjusticiable 3 (Oct. 7, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2336677 [https://perma.cc/37LW-3533] 
(arguing that Mulhall lacked standing). 
 293. For instance, in the majority of campaigns, unions seek agreements with employers to 
voluntarily recognize the union if it gains majority support, rather than use an NLRB election. 
See James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition:  Prospects for 
Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 839–40 (2005). 
 294. See, e.g., Prime Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 97 F. Supp. 3d 
1169, 1187–89 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing a Mulhall-based claim of section 302 violation 
because of a lack of facts showing a “delivery” of a benefit).  However, the Court could 
essentially eliminate these claims by finding that section 302 does not permit private rights of 
action.  In Justice Breyer’s Mulhall dissent, he questioned whether the assumption that section 
302 had a private right of action—which was confirmed in dicta by the Court in Sinclair 
Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 205 (1962)—still held true given the Court’s 
subsequent limits on implied private rights of action. See Mulhall, 134 S. Ct. at 595 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001)).  If Justice Breyer 
is correct, then section 302 enforcement would be dependent on the federal government 
pursuing a case.  It is possible that federal prosecutors would press cases that stretch the 
original intent of section 302, but that outcome is not likely and is certainly less of a risk to 
nontraditional representation groups than to claims by private parties. 
 295. See supra Part III (discussing existing quasi-union arrangements); see also Whitney, 
supra note 17, at 1473–74 (describing a section 302 suit, which was later withdrawn, against 
the VW-Chattanooga agreement with the UAW). 
 296. Section 302 covers only an “employer” giving something of value to (1) “any 
representative of any of his employees”; (2) “any labor organization . . . which 
represents . . . any of the employees of such employer”; (3) “any employee or group or 
committee of employees of such employer”; and (4) “any officer or employee of a labor 
organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (2012) 
 297. See United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299, 301 (1956) (holding that the LMRA 
expressly states that section 302’s use of “representative” shall have the same meaning as in 
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long as nontraditional groups are not “dealing with employers,”298 they 
should not be at risk for a section 302 violation.  Groups in this situation 
would have to decide whether reducing section 302 liability is worth the 
limitations required to avoid dealing with employers. 
2.  Lowering Organizational and Administrative Legal Burdens 
In addition to the mitigation of liability under section 302, nontraditional 
representation groups, particularly those found in the technology sector, can 
avoid many of the burdensome requirements of the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA).299  Although these requirements 
were intended, at least in part, to promote democracy and fairness for union 
members, they also impose extra costs for covered organizations—costs that 
can be significant for smaller organizations.300 
Among other things, the LMRDA imposes upon covered labor 
organizations (1) a duty of fair representation to members;301 (2) a 
requirement that organizations implement democratic processes, such as 
conducting regular secret-ballot elections302 and providing members the right 
to participate at meetings,303 to regularly elect leaders,304 and to vote on 
dues;305 and (3) a requirement that members be given due process rights 
against discipline.306  The LMRDA also requires detailed reporting on 
finances and time spent by organization leaders.307 
If nontraditional groups are not considered labor organizations under the 
LMRDA, they can incorporate whatever requirements they and their 
members believe are appropriate while maintaining flexibility to alter or 
eliminate requirements that are unduly burdensome or need improvement.308  
Whether groups can avoid the labor organization classification is not always 
clear, however. 
 
the NLRA).  Groups should also avoid being so closely entwined with a labor organization 
that they are considered a subsidiary covered by LMRA section 302. See supra note 281. 
 298. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2012) (defining a “labor organization” for the purposes of the 
NLRA’s section 8(a)(2) prohibitions). 
 299. See 29 U.S.C. § 431 (2012) (establishing reporting and disclosure obligations); id. 
§ 439 (permitting imposition of fines or incarceration for failure to file required reports). 
 300. J. Ralph Beaird, Employer and Consultant Reporting Under the LMRDA, 20 GA. L. 
REV. 533, 536–37 (1986) (describing the purpose of LMRDA); Thomas I.M. Gottheil, Note, 
Not Part of the Bargain:  Worker Centers and Labor Law in Sociohistorical Context, 89 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2228, 2263 (2014) (arguing that because there is no evidence of worker center 
abuse, placing costs of LMRDA compliance on worker centers is unwarranted). 
 301. See Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 73–78 (1991). 
 302. 29 U.S.C. § 481. 
 303. Id. § 411(a)(1). 
 304. Id. § 481(b). 
 305. Id. § 411(a)(3). 
 306. Id. § 411(a)(5). 
 307. Id. §§ 431(b), 436.  To see the forms required, which are quite complicated, see OLMS 
Electronic Forms System, U.S. DEP’T LAB. (Jan. 2, 2018), 
https://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/efs/efsintro.htm [https://perma.cc/RFQ6-DMB7]. 
 308. Cf. Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 127, at 1161–62 (arguing that groups not covered by 
LMRDA would still incorporate protections for members because groups would need support 
from workers to maintain credibility and effectiveness). 
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One complication for nontraditional groups’ ability to navigate their legal 
exposure under the LMRDA is that the statute arguably has a broader 
definition of “labor organization” than does the NLRA.  The LMRDA 
incorporates the definition of labor organization used in section 2(5) but also 
adds coverage for “any conference, general committee, joint or system board, 
or joint council so engaged which is subordinate to a national or international 
labor organization, other than a State or local central body.”309  Particularly 
for groups working with traditional unions, this addition creates the 
possibility of being classified as a labor organization for LMRDA purposes, 
even if they are not considered a labor organization under the NLRA.310  
Indeed, proemployer groups have already used this argument in an attempt 
to impose LMRDA requirements on nontraditional groups.311 
The potential for LMRDA coverage creates a double-edged sword for 
nontraditional groups that represent statutory employees—the more effective 
they are at representing their members, the more likely they are to be subject 
to the restrictions that accompany status as a labor organization.312  But if 
nontraditional groups are able to avoid this classification, they will be free to 
pursue a wider variety of financial and organizational models than is 
currently mandated by the LMRDA—models that would hopefully provide 
these groups a better opportunity to serve their members.313 
3. Freedom to Pursue Secondary Pressure 
and Other Strategies Prohibited by the NLRA 
Another set of legal limitations that nontraditional groups may avoid are 
the limits on the types of pressure that traditional unions can bring to bear 
against employers.  A larger set of pressure tactics is advantageous when 
groups decide to take a less cooperative stance against employers.  However, 
even cooperative strategies may involve some degree of pressure on 
employers, particularly when initially attempting to get an employer to 
participate in discussions.  Whether a quasi-union is merely trying to get an 
employer’s attention and interest in cooperation or is attempting to exert 
more forceful pressure, being nontraditional comes with certain legal 
advantages. 
 
 309. 29 U.S.C. § 402(i); see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2012). 
 310. See Catherine L. Fisk, Workplace Democracy and Democratic Worker Organizations:  
Notes on Worker Centers, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 101, 120–22 (2016). 
 311. Compare Stefan J. Marculewicz & Jennifer Thomas, Labor Organizations by Another 
Name:  The Worker Center Movement and Its Evolution into Coverage Under the NLRA and 
LMRDA, ENGAGE, Oct. 2012, at 79, 84–85 (2012) (arguing for expanded coverage of worker 
centers under LMRDA), with Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 
MICH. L. REV. 169, 229–30 (2015) (arguing that NLRA and LMRDA coverage should be the 
same), and Eli Naduris-Weissman, The Worker Center Movement and Traditional Labor Law:  
A Contextual Analysis, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 232, 287–91 (2009) (same). 
 312. David Rosenfeld, Worker Centers:  Emerging Labor Organizations—Until They 
Confront the National Labor Relations Act, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 469, 482–95, 502–
03 (2006) (discussing worker centers’ status as labor organizations under the NLRA and 
LMRDA). 
 313. See Fisk, supra note 310, at 120–22. 
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In the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments, Congress amended the NLRA by 
adding section 8(b), which prohibited labor organizations from engaging in 
various practices, including certain methods that unions had often used to 
pressure employers.314  Most important for nontraditional groups are section 
8(b)(4)’s limits on secondary pressure, such as boycotts and strikes that target 
businesses that deal with the employer at the center of the dispute.315  Prior 
to 1947, unions had long targeted businesses in the hopes that they might 
exert pressure on the “primary employer”—the employer with whom the 
union has the dispute.316  Under section 8(b)(4), labor organizations can still 
peacefully publicize a labor dispute, but they are prohibited from boycotting, 
striking, or picketing other employers who do business with the primary 
employer.317 
Although there are questions about section 8(b)(4)’s constitutionality, 
these restrictions have been repeatedly upheld against unions.318  Moreover, 
unlike unfair labor practices in which employees are the victims, employers 
can bring private lawsuits seeking compensatory damages against unions for 
violations of section 8(b)(4).319  However, section 8(b)(4) applies only to 
labor organizations as defined by the NLRA; thus, nontraditional groups that 
can avoid that designation are largely free to use secondary pressure to 
influence the behavior of employers.320 
Similarly, so-called “hot cargo” agreements between labor organizations 
and employers are illegal under section 8(e) of the NLRA.321  This means 
that, unlike traditional unions, nontraditional groups that avoid classification 
as a labor organization can seek and enter into agreements with a company 
to avoid doing business with another company that has committed unfair 
labor practices or other acts that the group opposes.322 
Recent events illustrate how nontraditional groups can engage in activities 
that might be viewed as violations of section 8(b)(4) had traditional unions 
been the primary actors.  The most high-profile example is OURWalmart’s 
efforts to improve the pay, benefits, and working conditions of Wal-Mart 
 
 314. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2012). 
 315. Id. § 158(b)(4). 
 316. See Richard A. Bock, Secondary Boycotts:  Understanding NLRB Interpretation of 
Section 8(b)(4)(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 905, 908–
18 (2005). 
 317. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 
U.S. 568, 583–84 (1988).  It is also illegal to picket when there is already a labor organization 
representing employees under 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) and to picket in an attempt to get the 
employer to fire a supervisor under 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B). 
 318. See Charlotte Garden, Labor Values Are First Amendment Values:  Why Union 
Comprehensive Campaigns Are Protected Speech, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2617, 2638 (2011). 
 319. See 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (2012); Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union v. 
Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258 (1964). 
 320. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5).  These groups might also enjoy protection from state lawsuits 
challenging certain peaceful secondary pressure by arguing that the NLRA preempts attempts 
to regulate such activity. Duff, supra note 51, at 849. 
 321. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e). 
 322. Id.  Section 8(b)(4)(A) also prohibits picketing to enforce or obtain a hot cargo 
agreement. Id. § 158(b)(4)(A). 
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employees.323  OURWalmart’s tactics included picketing, which led Wal-
Mart to allege that the group violated section 8(b).324  Wal-Mart argued that 
this provision was applicable because OURWalmart was affiliated with a 
traditional union and should therefore be considered a labor organization.325  
Wal-Mart’s willingness to pursue this action illustrates the potential 
advantages of nontraditional groups.  The existence of the suit itself indicates 
that OURWalmart’s pressure was having an impact. 
As long as nontraditional groups can avoid classification as labor 
organizations, or being considered part of such an organization, they will 
have much freer rein than traditional unions to impose pressure on employers.  
This is particularly true in the technology sector, which has many workers 
who are not classified as employees326 and is particularly susceptible to 
secondary pressure because of the industry’s breadth and substantial 
interaction with many different types of businesses.327 
B.  Potential Disadvantages of Alt-Labor Strategies 
Although nontraditional worker representation comes with certain legal 
advantages, working outside of the mainstream labor organization structure 
presents potential legal risks as well.  We believe that the likely advantages 
of nontraditional representation greatly outweigh these potential 
disadvantages—especially given the current anemic state of affairs for 
workers—but these risks are nonetheless important for groups to keep in 
mind as they make strategic decisions.328 
1.  Lack of Protection Against Retaliation 
One of the major risks for workers is that support for collective 
representation may expose them to employer retaliation or even loss of their 
jobs.329  This is less of a concern for statutory employees who, even if 
advocating or working for nontraditional representation, are typically 
protected by the NLRA.330  Seeking redress through the NLRB is often a 
laborious process with limited monetary remedies, but it does offer a degree 
of legal protection for employee collective action.  In contrast, the NLRA 
offers no protection against retaliation for workers who are not statutory 
 
 323. See Duff, supra note 51, at 838–43. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. at 838–40 (describing the informal resolution of a charge that alleged unlawful 
picketing for recognition, Fast Food Forward walkouts in 2013, and “day without immigrants” 
rallies in 2006). 
 326. See Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 642, 648–49 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (holding 
that section 8(b)(4) did not apply to an agricultural workers’ group because the workers were 
not employees under the NLRA). 
 327. See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 328. In addition to the disadvantages described here, working outside of NLRA coverage 
might result in more state regulation of representation activity, which the NLRA largely 
preempts with regard to traditional unions and the inability to enforce agreements in federal 
court. See Rosenfeld, supra note 312, at 500. 
 329. See supra Part IV.A. (discussing the NLRA’s antiretaliation provision). 
 330. See supra Part IV.A. 
1776 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
employees—or, like Uber drivers, workers whose status is in serious doubt.  
As a result, it may be difficult to recruit these workers to support and join 
nontraditional representation efforts, especially when their employers are 
openly hostile to such efforts.331 
This lack of legal protection against retaliation can be a significant barrier 
to the already difficult task of organizing workers—a task that is particularly 
hard for contingent and gig workers whose relative lack of physical proximity 
to coworkers make them less able to bond with each other.332  However, this 
issue also illustrates the advantage of more cooperative representation efforts.  
Because a hostile employer emboldened by a complete lack of NLRA 
protection is likely to intimidate workers to prevent them from acting 
together, nontraditional groups that can find ways to work with employers 
will be able to provide significant value to their members. 
2.  Antitrust Liability 
Among the potential disadvantages of nontraditional groups—and the 
most significant from a financial and criminal perspective—is antitrust law.  
Perhaps no issue better represents the knife’s edge facing nontraditional 
groups, which must carefully monitor whether their actions may constitute 
anticompetitive behavior under antitrust law and, if so, whether they will 
enjoy protection under the antitrust labor exception.  This task is made all the 
more difficult by the opacity of antitrust law as it applies to nontraditional 
labor efforts. 
Since the initial enactment of federal antitrust legislation, worker 
collective action has been a concern.  Indeed, immediately after passage of 
the Sherman Act in 1890, employers attacked unions by arguing that their 
attempts to restrict the supply of labor was an antitrust violation.333  
Ultimately, in 1914, Congress enacted the Clayton Act to provide an 
exemption for labor, although the Supreme Court has significantly limited its 
scope.334  Nevertheless, traditional unions and employers enjoy an antitrust 
exemption when engaging in most collective bargaining.335  Whether 
nontraditional representation enjoys or even needs an exemption is currently 
an open question. 
Under the Sherman Act, “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States . . . is declared to be illegal.”336  This law provided employers 
with an effective tool against unions and their officials, who would frequently 
 
 331. See, e.g., Elizabeth Dilts, U.S. Fast-Food Workers Rally for Higher Minimum Wage, 
CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 5, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-12-05/news/sns-rt-us-usa-
employment-fastfood-20131205_1_u-s-fast-food-workers-fast-food-forward-michael-
saltsman [https://perma.cc/3EAK-XPML] (describing worker protests). 
 332. See supra Part II.A (discussing contingent workers). 
 333. SECUNDA, supra note 19, at 8–12. 
 334. Id. at 11–12. 
 335. Susan Schwochau, The Labor Exemptions to Antitrust Law:  An Overview, 21 J. LAB. 
RES. 535, 536–37 (2000). 
 336. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
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face criminal sanctions and treble damages for boycotts that sought to 
pressure employers to hire union employees and other similar actions.337  As 
a result, Congress added an exemption to the Clayton Act, which was 
intended to remove antitrust liability for typical labor-union activity.338  
Despite its explicit statement that the “labor of a human being is not a 
commodity or an article of commerce,” the Supreme Court has interpreted 
this exemption narrowly.339 
Currently, there are two categories of antitrust exemptions for labor:  a 
statutory exemption and a nonstatutory exemption.340  The statutory 
exemption protects peaceful conduct related to a labor dispute in which “a 
union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups.”341  
This means that the exemption would apply to a union boycott of a company 
as part of a labor dispute but would not apply when a union acted with an 
employer to resolve a labor dispute.342 
The statutory exemption is clearly inapplicable to most nontraditional 
efforts, like the Uber Guild, which are premised on agreements with 
employers.343  Although at first blush the nonstatutory exemption seems to 
hold more promise for nontraditional groups, the exemption’s current 
interpretation is not particularly helpful.  The Court established the 
nonstatutory exemption in two cases involving union agreements with 
employers, holding that there was an antitrust exemption for a union that 
seeks and obtains an agreement about hours, wages, or other terms and 
conditions of work (that is, “mandatory” subjects of bargaining) with an 
employer or set of employers, as long as the union is not trying to extend the 
agreement to other employers.344  Nontraditional groups, like the Uber Guild, 
 
 337. See, e.g., Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 290–91 (1908). 
 338. This exemption states: 
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.  Nothing 
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and 
operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the 
purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to 
forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying 
out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members 
thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint 
of trade, under the antitrust laws. 
15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012). 
 339. See Sanjukta M. Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker 
Collective Action, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 969, 1020–33 (2016) (discussing the development of 
the antitrust exemption). 
 340. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996).  The Court has also 
recognized a nonstatutory antitrust exemption for employers that applies to conduct directly 
related to the collective-bargaining process. See id. at 250.  Moreover, Uber and many of its 
drivers are currently being sued for illegal price-fixing through Uber’s fare algorithm. See 
generally Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 341. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941). 
 342. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd. Electrical Workers, 325 U.S. 
797, 808 (1945) (holding that “mutual help” under the Clayton Act did not include unions’ use 
of “employer-help”). 
 343. See supra Part II.F (discussing the Uber Guild arrangement). 
 344. Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. 
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 688 (1965) (involving an agreement between union and 
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can argue that the nonstatutory exemption also protects their agreements with 
employers.  The problem, however, is that current judicial interpretations of 
the labor antitrust exemption have limited their application to groups 
considered “labor organizations” under federal labor law.345  In other words, 
this interpretation refuses to extend antitrust protection unless there is an 
employer-employee relationship or such a relationship was at the center of 
the dispute at issue (for instance, if Uber drivers engaged in conduct with the 
goal of establishing an employer-employee relationship).346 
This limited scope of the nonstatutory exemption appears to leave most 
nontraditional collective action outside of its protection.  The question, then, 
is whether a quasi-union’s conduct raises antitrust concerns.  Strikes and 
boycotts, as well as threats to engage in this activity, are areas that these 
groups need to avoid, as they raise significant antitrust risk.347  What is less 
clear is whether an agreement between an employer and a nontraditional 
group, like the Uber Guild agreement, would also raise antitrust concerns.348  
At present, antitrust law is simply unclear about whether such agreements 
constitute illegal price-fixing.  This lack of clarity poses a threat that 
nontraditional groups must take into account, but it also presents 
opportunities to pursue a litigation strategy that might result in favorable 
decisions that allow these groups leeway to reach some sort of agreement 
with employers without facing antitrust liability. 
This possible antitrust liability for nontraditional worker groups illustrates 
the paradox in modern labor law.  The changing economy begs for more 
 
multiemployer bargaining group that capped hours for butchers); United Mine Workers of 
Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 660 (1965) (involving an agreement between the union and 
mining companies to increase wages under an industry-wide collective-bargaining 
agreement).  Moreover, if the agreement would violate federal labor law, then the union could 
not use the exemption. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union 100, 421 
U.S 616, 636–37 (1975) (rejecting an exemption for an illegal hot cargo agreement). 
 345. Courts have held that the labor exemptions only cover “labor organizations” as that 
term is used in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, prohibiting federal court injunctions in cases arising 
out of most labor disputes. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 107 (2012); see, e.g., Taylor v. Local No. 7, Int’l 
Union of Journeymen Horseshoers of U.S. & Can., 353 F.2d 593, 602 (4th Cir. 1965) (citing 
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219); see also Paul, supra note 339, at 977 (noting that “individual 
workers classified as independent contractors may be subject to antitrust prosecution for 
organizing for decent wages or working conditions under the price-fixing doctrine”). 
 346. See Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union, Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prods. Inc., 311 
U.S. 91, 102–103 (1940) (holding that dispute between workers and employer is labor dispute 
while workers sought employee classification); New Negro All. v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 
U.S. 552, 562–63 (1938) (holding that picketing to encourage hiring was protected because it 
was within the matrix of a labor controversy); Taylor, 353 F.2d at 604–05 (rejecting exemption 
for independent contractors).  Activity by nonemployees that affect unionized employees’ 
work conditions may also be covered by the labor exception. See Am. Fed’n of Musicians of 
U.S. & Can. v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 106, 112–13 (1968) (looking to whether the activity was 
directed at an economic relationship, such as job or wage competition, between independent 
contractors and union employees that would affect the interests of the union employees); L.A. 
Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 102 (1962) (looking to whether 
the activity was directed at an economic relationship). 
 347. See, e.g., Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 239–41. 
 348. See Chris Opfer, Gig Worker Organizers Find Hurdle in Antitrust Laws, Antitrust & 
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 110, at 1365 (Nov. 25, 2016) (noting questions about Uber Guild 
and similar groups’ liability under antitrust law). 
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modern and less formal worker collective action, but labor law remains 
locked in a model that is no longer relevant to an increasing number of 
workers.  As a result, groups are forced to make a decision:  (1) to act like a 
traditional labor union and accept the burdens and hurdles of current labor 
law that accompanies that choice or (2) to seek new ways of representing 
workers but limit their actions out of fear of antitrust liability.349  Although 
this paradox begs for legislative or judicial solutions, such help does not 
appear to be on the horizon.  Indeed, recent reports suggest that the new 
administration may try to increase the burdens on nontraditional groups.350  
In the meantime, antitrust liability will be a significant factor in shaping 
nontraditional groups’ strategies and actions. 
V.  NONTRADITIONAL REPRESENTATION STRATEGIES 
One of the benefits of nontraditional worker representation is that it 
promises more flexibility to adjust to different circumstances.  As we have 
described, workers in the modern economy are laboring under a wide variety 
of conditions.  This variance means that there is no one ideal strategy for 
nontraditional groups to pursue as they navigate the different legal 
restrictions that might apply to them.  However, the conditions under which 
a group operates—as well as the group’s goals and tolerance for risk—may 
point toward certain general strategies. 
There are at least two broad categories of nontraditional groups.  One 
category involves groups that represent workers who are not considered 
employees under the NLRA or possibly, like members of the Uber Guild, are 
simply not pressing the issue.351  This scenario provides a relatively 
straightforward legal analysis.  Because the workers are not statutory 
employees, groups representing them will not be a labor organization.352  
Accordingly, such groups need not worry about the restrictions of sections 
8(a)(2), 8(b)(4), and 8(e) of the NLRA, or of section 302 of the LMRA; thus, 
these groups can receive assistance from employers, pursue secondary 
pressure, and reach agreements with employers without fear of liability.353  
Moreover, groups with only nonemployee members are not required to 
 
 349. Cf. Paul, supra note 339, at 982.  The director of an independent trucker campaign 
said that the threat of antitrust liability “was one of the three or four major strategic factors in 
virtually everything that we did.  It was part of our checklist.  The specter of antitrust liability 
has significantly suppressed drivers’ ability to take collective action to change their economic 
circumstances.” Id.  The campaign’s counsel was quoted as saying, “Apart from the merits 
and whether damages were recovered, the sheer cost of defending such an action would have 
been sufficient to shut the campaign down.” Id. 
 350. Chris Opfer & Jasmine Ye Han, Worker Centers May Get Closer Look Under Trump, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 3 (Feb. 15, 2017). 
 351. Groups with members who are arguably employees risk the possibility that the NLRB 
or a court will subsequently determine that the workers are statutory employees. 
 352. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2012) (defining a “labor organization” as an entity “in which 
employees participate”). 
 353. Groups must still be cognizant of state claims, such as trespassing, but that is true for 
labor organizations as well. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cty. Dist. Council of 
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 185–86 (1978) (describing labor preemption analysis for 
independent state claims). 
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comply with the LMRDA and therefore have more flexibility to structure 
their operations. 
Even so, the nonemployee members of such groups lack protection against 
retaliation, which creates a hurdle to organizing workers.  But it also means 
that groups can provide value by reaching agreements with employers that 
provide some level of job security, such as the Uber Guild’s negotiation of 
the right to challenge dismissal from the Uber platform.354  The biggest risk 
for groups in this category, as noted, is antitrust liability.355  Although the 
lack of labor organization status frees such groups to engage in bilateral 
negotiations with businesses without the specter of a section 8(a)(2) 
violation, any resulting agreements could face antitrust challenges.  And 
although the applicability of antitrust law to agreements covering 
nonemployees is unclear,356 nontraditional groups must consider their 
tolerance for risk.  Groups that are more risk averse should avoid agreements 
that control wages and work stoppages357—which could arguably be 
considered unlawful price-fixing—and focus instead on other work issues, 
like the Uber agreement’s guarantee of meetings with company officials and 
the right to challenge exclusion from the platform.358  Groups with a higher 
risk tolerance, including those with the means to withstand potential treble 
damages (or are judgment proof because of a lack of funds), may be more 
willing to reach agreements on financial and work stoppage issues on the 
grounds that the benefits to workers outweigh a potential antitrust challenge.  
In sum, groups that represent nonemployees can more aggressively pressure 
employers and organize themselves freely, but their members lack protection 
from retaliation and potential antitrust liability looms over their negotiations 
with employers. 
The second category involves groups that represent statutory employees.  
Employee-representation groups should generally consider two separate 
tracks:  either attempt to avoid classification as a labor organization or 
willingly accept labor organization status.  For groups that want to avoid 
being a labor organization, section 2(5) will be their lodestar.  These groups 
must avoid bilateral negotiations over terms and conditions of work, which 
may be considered “dealing with” employers.359  This puts a significant 
limitation on the degree to which groups can represent employees—making 
the groups more of a suggestion box for issues involving work conditions 
than an effective representative body.  These groups could engage in more 
substantive negotiations of other issues—such as contracting out work—but 
would not be able to engage in significant cooperative bargaining.360  
 
 354. See supra Part II.F (discussing Uber Guild). 
 355. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 356. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the possibility of antitrust liability for quasi-unions). 
 357. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 358. See supra Part II (discussing alternative labor arrangements). 
 359. See supra Part IV.A (discussing provisions of the NLRA). 
 360. The terms and conditions of work referred to in section 2(5) are equivalent to 
“mandatory subject[s] of bargaining” under the NLRA, which are distinct from permissive 
subjects that include agreements regarding most contracting out of work, among other matters. 
See First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 678 (1981). 
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However, these groups could still provide services to members without being 
hampered by the restrictions on secondary pressure from section 8(b)(4) and 
the requirements of the LMRDA.  They could also receive assistance from 
employers without violating section 8(a)(2).  Antitrust liability would remain 
a theoretical concern, but by avoiding bargaining that would result in labor 
organization status, the groups would likely avoid any meaningful antitrust 
challenges.  Overall, such groups would enjoy the freedom to organize as 
they wish, have members who enjoy protection against retaliation, be able to 
exert pressure on secondary employers, and likely avoid antitrust issues; yet, 
the groups’ ability to bargain with employers would be significantly limited. 
For employee-representation groups that are willing to accept status as a 
labor organization, the second track is much different from the first.  Because 
these groups represent employees, their members enjoy protection from 
retaliation.  However, unless these groups want to become a traditional union 
that acts as the exclusive representative of employees, their bargaining 
options are limited.  Under section 8(a)(2), an employer cannot recognize a 
group as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees unless that 
group has majority support.361  A willing employer would be able to engage 
in meaningful bargaining and reach an agreement with a labor organization 
that represents a minority of employees—such as what happened initially at 
Volkswagen Chattanooga—but it must avoid undue assistance or support 
under section 8(a)(2).362  Moreover, such agreements could potentially face 
section 302 challenges if they include access and other promises.363  These 
groups would also be prohibited from engaging in secondary pressure and, 
although nontraditional, they would have to comply with LMRDA 
requirements.  However, such groups would enjoy the same antitrust 
immunity as traditional unions, which removes a potentially substantial 
threat.  In short, these groups would operate under most of the same legal 
restrictions as traditional unions even though their goals fall short of the 
exclusive-representation model. 
There is thus no “ideal” quasi-union for modern workers.  Rather, the 
group should be tailored to fit the particular employer as well as the needs 
and demands of the workers.  Many quasi-unions in the technology sector 
will fit the first category discussed above, as they will be comprised largely 
of contingent, nonemployee workers.  Other groups, however, represent 
statutory employees and must be mindful of the legal consequences of their 
representational activity.  Ultimately, just like no two labor unions are alike, 
nontraditional unions must be carefully crafted, each in a unique way, to fit 
the particular demands of a specific workplace. 
 
 361. Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (Bernhard-Altmann Tex. Corp.) v. NLRB, 366 
U.S. 731, 737–38 (1961). 
 362. See supra Part II (discussing Volkswagen’s quasi-union arrangement).  That said, 
NLRA section 8(a)(2) only results in a violation against the employer, so this is less of a 
concern for the labor organization.  And employers may not be too concerned given the lack 
of financial penalties. See supra Part IV (discussing statutory provisions of the NLRA). 
 363. See supra Part IV. 
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CONCLUSION 
Traditional union membership may never return to the levels of its zenith 
in the 1950s.  Yet workers’ need for advocacy and assistance is now as strong 
as, if not stronger than, it was then.364  Given the immense impediments to 
legislative reform, it is almost certain that we will not see any wholesale labor 
law changes that could reverse declining union density in the near future.365  
Thus, unions and other groups concerned with working conditions must seek 
alternative strategies.  Nowhere is this need more pronounced than in the 
technology sector, where workers’ employment status remains in flux. 
One strategy addressed here is to seek more opportunities for cooperation 
with employers.  This cooperation has the potential to lower employer 
resistance to formal and informal unionization, increase employee support 
for unions and nontraditional worker groups, and improve the public’s 
perception of labor organizations.  None of these benefits are certain and, 
even if they come to fruition, are not likely to completely turn the tide in 
favor of worker collective action.  But expanding cooperation as a 
complement to more combative strategies is an idea that warrants more 
serious exploration by unions and quasi-unions alike. 
The traditional NLRA model of collective bargaining is working for a 
declining number of unions and workers.  As a result, the attachment to that 
model must weaken.  The more adversarial model can still play an important 
role, but, by itself, it appears to be failing a growing percentage of the 
workforce.  Workers need and deserve other options, whether through 
traditional unions that are willing to change or other less formal groups.  The 
global economic headwinds will remain a significant barrier to organizing 
and other attempts to improve working conditions, but this does not mean 
that workers are helpless.  Workers may never see the labor movement return 
to its former strength, but through more cooperation and quasi-union 
strategies, workers should be able to overcome the precarious situation they 
currently face. 
The NLRA has unfortunately not been very hospitable to these 
nontraditional working groups, effectively reducing the choice set for most 
workers to a binary decision:  either engage with traditional unions or submit 
to complete management control.366  What we argue for here is a third option 
 
 364. See supra Part I. 
 365. See Estlund, supra note 234, at 1527–28. 
 366. Alex Bryson and Richard Freeman find that underlying preferences among workers 
are roughly similar in the United States and the United Kingdom but that workplace outcomes 
differ because the United Kingdom provides a greater range of institutional options than does 
the United States. Alex Bryson & Richard B. Freeman, Worker Needs and Voice in the US 
and the UK 22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12310, 2006), 
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dichotomous choice between collective bargaining and no representation in the US 
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unfilled demand for unions among non-union workers than in the UK; whereas the 
2018] UNIONS IN THE MODERN ECONOMY 1783 
that can be attractive to both workers and companies—a more flexible, 
nontraditional labor model.  As discussed, this approach makes particular 
sense in the technology sector, and companies like Uber should continue to 
develop and fine-tune these new models.  “We can’t fall into the trap of 
believing that the latest innovation is so transformational that we simply can’t 
accommodate and acclimate.”367  A more modern union is needed. 
 
 
wider choice of voice institutions in the UK attracts many to take the free rider 
option. 
Id. 
 367. Exit Memorandum, supra note 1, at 13. 
